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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
Local governance in Zimbabwe dates back to the 1890s when the colonial administration of the 
day, the British South African Company (BSAC) established the first formal local authority, the  
Salisbury Sanitary Board to administer local affairs.
1
 Local government was not provided for in 
the Constitution but became a creature of statute which meant that the local government system 
did not have constitutional protection. Subsequent local government instruments and institutions 
such as municipal ordinances as well as advisory boards and councils were established and all 
fell under the direct control of the District Commissioner who sought to reinforce colonial policy 
in African townships. The centrally-defined local governance institutions and structures were 
instituted to deny African self-government, residents, mostly from urban areas, resisted the 
entrenched racial legal and institutional frameworks. The centralised local government system 
imposed substandard and centrally-defined programmes on African and Native Councils and 
„laid the foundation for a highly centralised post-colonial local governance system that was 
inherited at independence in 1980‟.2 
The post-colonial era saw the creation of a single local government Ministry and the 
amalgamation of African Councils into District Councils governed by new legislation, namely 
the Rural District Councils Act
3
 and the Urban Councils Act
4
. It should be noted that the new 
post-colonial dispensation did not seek to loosen central government‟s stranglehold on local 
authorities but perpetuated the dominance over local councils by empowering the Minister of 
Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) to provide strict monitoring 
mechanisms for local councils. Consequently the post-colonial political establishment is often 
blamed for failing to redress the centralisation of powers by central government and to 
democratise local government.
5
 What appears to be misconstrued by many people in Zimbabwe 
                                                          
1
 Jordan JD Local Government in Zimbabwe: An Overview (The Mambo Press Gweru 1984) 12. 
2
 Madhekeni A & Zhou G „Legal and Institutional Framework: The „Achilles Heel‟of Local Authorities and Raison 
D‟etre of Ministerial Intervention in Zimbabwe”‟ (2012) Journal of Public Administration and Development 2 (3)20 
3
 Chapter 29.13, Rural District Councils Act (1996). 
4
 Chapter 29.15, Urban councils Act, (1996). 
5
 Blunt G „Overcoming a decade of crisis: Zimbabwe‟s Local Authorities in transition‟ 2011 Journal of Public 
Administration and Development 31 (4) 340-350. 
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is the fact that the governing legal and institutional framework of local governance in the country 
provides room for the responsible Minister to legally enable or disable local authority 
administration.
6
 The intervention by the Minister has been viewed as the „Achilles Heel‟ of local 
authorities presents a major weakness in the administration of local government affairs in the 
country.
 7
  One of the pieces of legislation that has promoted legal intervention by the MLGRUD 
is section 4A of the Urban Councils Act in which the Minister monitors or appoints special 
interest councillors in all urban councils in the country. Public outcry and negative media reports 
on the implementation of section 4A has resulted in loss of faith with the way the MLGRUD has 
been implementing this legislation.  
1.2 Statement of the problem          
The appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act 
has encountered much opposition from residents in many urban areas.
8
 The appointment has also 
attracted public attention, especially through the media which has highlighted the plight of urban 
councils most of which have failed to contend with additional unelected personnel on their 
payrolls. There has also been a claim that the process of appointing special interest councillors 
may be or that it is being abused.
9
 What has further exacerbated this situation is the fact that 
there is no legal provision to check the powers of the Minister, leaving room for the 
manipulation of the powers to appoint.
10 Since the enactment of section 4A of the Urban 
Councils Act (UCA) in April 2008, numerous elected councillors and mayors belonging to the 
MDC have been dismissed, or summarily suspended pending dismissal to justify the 
appointment of special interest councillors over and above elected councillors. At the same time 
the Minister seeks to discredit the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) councillors as 
incompetent to gain political mileage for the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU PF).
11
 The rampant dismissal and suspension of MDC-T (the MDC faction led by Mr 
Morgan Tsvangirai) councillors and mayors and dissolving urban councils has led to allegations 
that the Minister seeks to weaken MDC in urban local councils and to justify the existence of 
special interest councillors in urban councils. By highlighting and examining the implications of 
these appointments on urban governance and the general functioning of urban local councils, the 
                                                          
6
 Bland G „Overcoming a Decade of Crisis: Zimbabwe‟s Local Authorities in Transition‟ (2011) Journal of Public 
Administration and Development 31 (4) 342. 
7
 Madhekeni & Zhou 25. 
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researcher will be able to assess the practice of appointing special interest councillors against 
internationally accepted norms.  
1.3 Significance of the problem 
 
This section explains the significance of the problem of appointing special interest councillors in 
urban councils as discussed above.  Most urban local councils argue that the appointment of 
special interest councillors has become a financial burden on the councils since the appointees 
should be paid by the respective councils where they are appointed.
12
 The print media
 
has also 
highlighted the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the Urban 
Councils Act. A cross section of media reports has presented the appointment of special interest 
councillors as a controversial practice that has led to a deterioration of relations between the 
MLGRUD and most urban councils13 as well as between residents and the MLGRUD.14 Both 
residents and elected councils have been angered by the fact that while many elected councillors 
have either been suspended and/or dismissed,15 no such action has been taken against appointed 
special interest councillors. The media reports have also noted that most local councils view the 
appointment of such councillors by the MLGRUD as abuse of power by the Minister with some 
threatening to take legal action16. Other media reports have expressed the view that the Minister‟s 
powers be reduced.17 Precious Shumba has acknowledged that special interest councillors may 
help to enrich debates in local councils. However he has noted that currently special interest 
councillors are a liability to most local councils that do not have the resources to accommodate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
 Sibanda A „Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councilors‟ Bulawayo24, 16 May 2012. 
9
 Harare Residents Trust.‟Chitungwiza Residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo‟ SW Africa Radio, 13 
February 2012. 
10
 ‘Bulawayo: Chombo Tries (again) to impose “Special Interest‟ Councillors‟” Zimbabwe Metro 24 April 2012.  
11
 Ndlovu N „Zimbabwe: Special Interest Councilors Dismissed‟ The Standard, 14 April 2012. 
12
 S 4A (2), Urban Councils‟ Act (2008). 
13
 “Chombo Risks Lawsuit” in Zimbabwe Daily News, May 23, 2010; CHRA,  2012- Brian James suspension 
Exposes Urgent Need for Local Government Reform!. 
14
 Sibanda A „Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councillors‟ Bulawayo24, 19 May 
2012. 
15
 Chombo has of January 2012 suspended a total of four MDC councillors in Harare for corruption. These were five 
in Rusape, one in Nyaminyami Rural District Council; two in Zvimba Rural District Council; and two in Harare 
Municipality – Councillors Warship Dumba and Casper Takura who had opened a council probe on the minister on 
how he had acquired so many properties in Harare, Brian James becomes the latest victim. 
16
 Staff Reporter „Chombo Risks Lawsuit‟ in Zimbabwe Daily News, 23 May 2010. 
17
 MISA “Residents wants Chombo's powers clipped” Human Rights-The Zimbabwean, 18 September 2010.  
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such appointments.18 The Combined Harare Residents‟ Association (CHRA) has expressed the 
need for local government reforms19 as a way of strengthening local democracy, while the Harare 
Residents‟ Trust has equally expressed concerns with the way the Minister has been making 
these appointments.20All the media reports have roundly expressed criticism of the ministerial 
powers to appoint special interest councillors with the Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(MISA) suggesting that the Minister‟s „wings be clipped‟.21 This thesis seeks to provide a critical 
analysis of such appointments given that most media reports have gone as far as expressing 
opposition to such appointments without providing a critical analysis of the practice.  
1.4 Research Question and Objectives of the Study  
 
The study questions the criteria employed by the MLGRUD to appoint special interest 
councillors for urban areas and the implication of such appointments on local democracy. A 
survey of international and comparative legislative and regulatory frameworks as well as the 
Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee draft constitution (herein COPAC draft) will be 
undertaken to establish democratic elements of local governance. From the normative 
framework, the researcher will draw elements of representative democratic local governance that 
will be used to assess section 4A of the Urban Councils Act against international best practices 
and the COPAC draft. The COPAC draft came as a result of inter-political party deliberations 
and public consultations on a new constitution for Zimbabwe to replace the existing Lancaster 
House Constitution of 1979. Hence the researcher also intends to establish the extent to which 
the COPAC draft provides for representative local government. The researcher will investigate 
the extent to which the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the 
Urban Councils Act complies with principles of representative democracy as provided in 
international instruments and the COPAC draft
22
.  
The researcher will seek to:  
                                                          
18
 Shumba P  „Special Interest councillors ideal but not necessary‟ SW Africa Radio, 17 SW Africa Radio, 26 March 
2012. 
19
 CHRA,„Brian James suspension Exposes Urgent Need for Local Government Reform!‟. 
20
 Harare Residents Trust. „Chitungwiza Residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo‟ SW Africa Radio, 13 
February 2012.  
21
 MISA „Residents wants Chombo's powers clipped‟ The Zimbabwean, 18 September 2010.  
22
 S 14 of the COPAC draft provides for Provincial, Metropolitan and Local council structures and institutions as 
well as the election of local council office bearers. 
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(i) Extrapolate elements of representative governance from selected international and 
   regional instruments as well as from the COPAC draft. 
 
(ii) Assess the impact of the appointment of special interest councillors on the 
relationship between local authorities and central government. 
 
(iii) Test the extent to which the appointment of special interest councillors in terms of 
section 4A encroaches on local democracy. 
 
(iv) Test the practice of appointing special interest councillors in terms of section 4A 
against international standards and COPAC draft provisions on representative 
governance. 
 
(v) Provide recommendation of improving the appointment of councillors in line with 
representative democracy. 
1.5 Literature Review   
 
While much concern has been expressed in literary works about the Ministerial powers in the 
operations of local councils (both in rural and urban areas), there is no critical analysis of the 
practice of appointing special interest councillors. Most of those who have written about the 
appointment of special interest councillors have concentrated on the general MLGRUD‟s powers 
over the affairs of local councillors without focusing on a critical analysis of section 4A of the 
Urban Councils Act that empowers the Minister to make such appointments. While Chakaipa 
23
 
has written about special interest councillors, the author only mentions these appointed officials 
in light of electoral processes as well as the introduction of such a portfolio in urban areas and 
does not say anything about the operation or impact of such appointed councillors in urban 
governance. Additionally, the major part of Chakaipa‟s discussion is confined to elected 
councillors and local government electoral process. Mushamba
24 
discusses special interest 
councillors in relation to decentralisation of power from central to local authorities but he does 
not explain about their appointment and the role of the Minister in such appointment. Media 
houses in Zimbabwe have flip-flopped about the issue of the appointment of special interest 
councillors. Although the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) has argued about the need 
                                                          
23
 Chakaipa S „Local government institutions and elections‟ in de Visser J; Steytler N & Machingauta N (eds) Local 
Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 31-68. 
24
 Mushamba S „The powers and functions of local government authorities‟ De Visser J; Steytler N & Machingauta 
N (eds) Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 101-120. 
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to amend of the Urban Councils Act in order to reduce the powers of the MLGRUD in general, it 
has not focused on the appointment of special interest councillors per se.
 
Machingauta
25
 has 
come closer to addressing the issue of special interest councillors but the author tended to 
confine himself to “the appointment of caretakers to act as councils” in terms of section 80 of the 
Urban Councils Act of Zimbabwe. Again Machingauta‟s discussion of special interest 
councillors is on the basis of the broader caretaker framework in which caretakers may be 
appointed to act as full council in certain circumstances, but does not specifically refer to section 
4A of the Urban Councils Act. In her thesis, Madzivanyika
26
 provides a generic catalogue of 
legislative weaknesses in the Urban Councils Act that impact on efficient and effective service 
delivery. However the thesis does not discuss the issue of special interest councillors in detail 
since it was not the focus of the study. However, most importantly the study will draw from the 
recently published Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC)
27
 constitutional draft 
which is due for consideration at the referendum towards the end of 2012 or early 2013. The 
COPAC draft is vital in this study because, despite the fact that it is yet not law, it is the first 
attempt in Zimbabwe to incorporate local government in the Constitution. From the COPAC 
draft the researcher will analyse section 14 which provides for local government structures and 
institutions as well as the election of local council officials. 
1.6 Methodology 
 
The thesis mainly based on review of secondary sources such as legislation and regulatory 
frameworks to test the compliance of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act with regards to 
representative governance. In addition, the researcher conducted a random survey of twenty (20) 
urban local councils to establish the composition of their special interest councillors. The basic 
criterion that was used to select the councils was that these should be functional urban local 
councils with some councillors whose composition would then be used in appointing special 
interest councillors by the MLGRUD. In order to get information on special interest councillors 
                                                          
25
 Machingauta N A legal analysis of the appointment of caretakers to act as council in terms of Zimbabwe‟s section 
80 of the Urban Councils Act (unpublished LLM  thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2010) 
26
 Madzivanyika L The impact of weaknesses in the Urban Councils Act on efficient and effective service delivery in 
urban local councils in Zimbabwe (unpublished LLM Research paper, University of the Western Cape, 2011. 
27
 The Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) is an inter-party committee of parliamentarians that was tasked by 
the Unity Government in Zimbabwe to make public consultations for a new constitution. The Draft will be taken to 
a referendum either late 2012 or early 2013 before it can be adopted as the new Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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for the selected local councils, the researcher reviewed documents pertaining to each council, 
minutes of local council meetings as well as through using websites for the selected councils.   
During the survey, the researcher sought information from appointed special interest councilors 
in the selected local authorities. The local councils were selected at random, irrespective of their 
city/town status. From the special interest councillors, the researcher sought information about 
the skills/expertise which they bring to the local council, their political alignment and gender.  
1.7 Chapter outline  
 
The thesis will be made up of five chapters. Chapter one provides the key aspects of the thesis, 
notably the problem statement, argument and its originality, methodology and the methodology 
used in the study. 
Chapter two provides a framework for local representative governance. The chapter will explore 
and analyse selected legislative and regulatory frameworks that focus on representative 
democratic governance. The study will extrapolate from the COPAC draft critical features of 
democratic local governance. In addition, the researcher will extrapolate elements of 
representative governance from international and regional instruments. The normative 
frameworks for best practices and benchmarks in representative governance will be drawn from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, UN-Habitat-Urban Governance Index; 
European Charter of Local Self-Government; African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights; 
United Cities and Local Government of Africa model; the Kigali Declaration; and the Victoria 
Falls Declaration.  
Chapter three provides a discussion of local government structures and institutions in Zimbabwe 
and the appointment of special interest councillors. The legal framework and policy rationale of 
appointing special interest councillors in urban councils by the MLGRUD will be the focus of 
this chapter. The chapter will start off by presenting the history of local government in 
Zimbabwe and the appointment of special interest councillors, a practice which had initially 
started in rural councils in terms of section 60 of the District and Rural Councils Act.  The study 
will also provide the content of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act, highlighting the role of 
the Minister. The researcher presents a brief discussion on the genesis of the appointment of 
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special interest councillors initially in rural areas and later in urban areas in terms of section 4A 
of the Urban Councils Act.  
Chapter four makes a comparative discussion of the practice of appointing special interest 
councillors and the normative framework drawn from international instruments and the COPAC 
draft. In this chapter the researcher tests section 4A of the Urban Councils Act against elements 
of representative democratic local governance drawn from the COPAC draft as well as from 
international instruments. The focus is on the ministerial powers to appoint special interest 
councillors and whether such appointments are acceptable practice in a representative democracy 
and what impact this practice has on service delivery and local councils decision-making 
processes. Consequently this chapter tests and compares the provisions of section 4A of the UCA 
to the critical features of representative democratic local governance drawn from the COPAC 
draft and other international and regional instruments.  
Chapter five provides a conclusion based on the comparative analysis of section 4A of the UCA 
against international instruments and the COPAC draft. The comparative analysis will seek to 
test the extent to which section 4A of the UCA complies with elements of representative 
democracy drawn from international instruments and the COPAC draft. The conclusion also 
highlights any shortfalls of section 4A of the UCA and local governance elements of COPAC 
that would make it a better document to local governance structures and institutions. 
Recommendations on how to improve the Zimbabwean local government system will be 
presented after identifying gaps in the implementation of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act 
of 2008. 
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CHAPTER TWO: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to provide a normative framework for local representative governance. To be 
able to provide the normative framework, the researcher will extrapolate critical features of 
representative governance from the different international and regional instruments as well as the 
Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) constitutional draft. The chapter explores 
selected instruments to extra the critical features of democratic governance.  By using the critical 
features of democratic governance extrapolated from the instruments, the researcher will be able 
to provide a critical analysis of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act which empowers the 
Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) to appoint special 
interest councillors. The instruments that were discussed are categorised into four sections which 
are: 
 international instruments to which Zimbabwe is not a signatory; 
 international instruments to which Zimbabwe is a signatory; 
 African regional instruments to which Zimbabwe is a signatory; as well as 
 the draft constitution of Zimbabwe which is yet to become law.  
2.2 Instruments to which Zimbabwe is not a signatory 
 
This category of instruments is noted for its provision of critical features of democratic 
representative democracy in designated regions such as the Asian and Pacific region as well as 
countries covered by the European Union. In different regions of the world, guidelines have been 
used to provide guidance on govern local governance. There are several international instruments 
that provide for democratic local governance in different parts of the world that may not be 
relevant to Zimbabwe but from which the country can draw significant lessons. 
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The international instruments to which Zimbabwe is not a signatory are the European Charter of 
Self-Government (2010) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP)-Good Governance (2006). These instruments provide a general framework from 
which Zimbabwe can draw critical features of democratic local governance. Although these 
instruments refer to local government in Europe and Asia and the Pacific regions, but Zimbabwe 
can draw from them. The Charter recognises the autonomy of local authorities and the right of 
local communities to take part in the election of local councillors.
28
 With regards to the 
autonomy of local councils, the Charter recognises the right and the ability of local authorities to 
regulate and manage public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interest of the local 
population.
29
 The Charter also highlights the composition of local councils which should 
comprise members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal 
suffrage.
30
  
The UNESCAP-Good Governance Index provides eight generic critical features of good 
governance which are participation, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, 
responsiveness, rule of law, accountability and transparency. The instruments do not have 
provision for the appointment of local councillors. From these instruments critical features of 
local governance will be identified. For this thesis, these two instruments help in setting 
standards to test the extent to which section of 4A of the UCA conforms to representative 
governance standards.  In addition the index provides a framework for democratisation of the 
country‟s local government system. 
2.3 International instruments to which Zimbabwe is a signatory 
 
There are several international instruments to which Zimbabwe is a signatory. These include the 
United Nations-Habitat –Good Urban Governance Index (2004) and the United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG). The instruments are included in this study to provide a picture of the 
extent to which they provide critical features of democratic governance. The discussion of these 
instruments also provides a framework for international best practice on which to test local 
government legislation in Zimbabwe and establish whether it complies with international best 
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practices in local government. The United Nations-Habitat –Good Urban Governance Index 
(2004) provides benchmarks for transparent and democratic local governance. The United Cities 
and Local Governments (UCLG) provides a forum for the promotion of democratic local 
governance. The UCLG Constitution places obligation local government institutions to promote 
local democracy. The UCLG Committee on Decentralisation and Self-Government has as its 
main objective „to strengthen decentralisation and local self-government processes with the aim 
of improving local governance in every region of the world‟.31 The work of the Committee 
contributes to the strategy of the World Organisation of United Cities and Local Government in 
the field of local governance and seeks to influence local governance practices across the globe. 
2.4 African regional instruments to which Zimbabwe is a signatory  
 
In addition to the two categories of instruments discussed above, there are African regional 
instruments which are created by African countries. In the African region, the most notable local 
government instruments are the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA). The 
others are the Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT) 
(1990); the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2012); 
the All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD); the Victoria Falls 
Declaration (1999); the Kigali Declaration (2006) and the Harare Declaration (1999). The 
different international and regional instruments as well as the COPAC draft are discussed in 
detail. From all the instruments the researcher extrapolated critical features of democratic local 
governance which will be used to test the extent to which the legislation and practice of 
appointing special interest councillors in terms of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act (UCA).  
It should be noted that most of the instruments that will be explored are „soft laws‟ which are 
commitments made by negotiating parties that are not legally binding. „Soft laws‟ are 
characterised by the relatively large amount of discretion which is left to the parties bound by the 
obligation.
32
 However it should be noted that although „soft laws‟ are discretionary in nature, 
they are not without important legal and political effects. They help to promote co-existence and 
exchange of information among state parties as a way of finding common ground on issues of 
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national, regional and international importance. As such it can be pointed out that soft law 
instruments are only potentially binding and can be conceived of as the beginning of a gradual 
process in which further steps are needed to make such agreements binding rules for states.
33
 
This is the premise on which the instruments that are explored for this thesis will be regarded. 
2.5 The Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) draft 
 
It should be noted that although the COPAC draft is not yet law, its provisions on local 
government highlight democratic local governance. Given that the local government is old, the 
draft holds prospects for representative democratic governance.  
The frameworks will be used in this chapter to determine the extent to which section 4A of the 
Zimbabwe Urban Councils Act complies with elements of representative democratic governance.  
In addition to the wide range of legislative, institutional and regulatory frameworks that provide 
acceptable standards of representative democratic governance, a brief discussion of Zimbabwe‟s 
Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) constitutional draft on decentralisation and 
devolution will be provided.
34
 From the selected legislative and regulatory frameworks, this 
section will identify the objectives of each instrument as well as the legal status, guiding 
principles, elements of democracy and decentralisation and cooperative governance as well as 
whether the framework recognises local governance. The findings from this discussion will 
provide the basis for the analysis of local government practices in Zimbabwe, notably the 
provisions of section 4A and the extent to which this legislation resonate with these elements of 
good local governance.  
2.6 Legislative and regulatory frameworks providing for critical features of representative 
governance  
 
In exploring the different instruments, the researcher will present the background, legal force and 
relevance of the instruments to local governance as well as the elements of representative 
governance. A detailed analysis of the COPAC draft and international instruments will be used 
to test section 4 A.  
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2.7 International framework for local governance  
 
A brief discussion of the UN-Habitat-Good Urban Governance Index and the United Cities and 
Local Governments guidelines as instruments providing for generic guidelines for good local 
governance is provided. 
2.7.1  United Nations Habitat-Good Urban Governance Index (UGI) 
 
 2.7.1.1 Background and purpose 
 
The United Nations-Habitat Urban Governance Index (UGI) was developed by the Global Urban 
Observatory and the Global Campaign on Urban Governance to provide a normative framework 
for good urban governance. The UGI is an advocacy and capacity-building tool that assists urban 
councils and countries in monitoring the quality of urban governance. The objectives of the UGI 
are „to demonstrate the importance of good urban governance in achieving broad development 
objectives‟ at global level, and at local level „to catalyse local action to improve the quality of 
urban governance by developing indicators that respond directly to their unique contexts and 
needs‟35 and to contribute to the strengthening and improving of urban governance.36 The UGI 
provides a blueprint for good urban governance practices in urban areas across the globe. The 
UGI is anchored in its desire to promote participatory local governance in urban areas including 
participatory budgeting. 
The UGI graph below is important for this thesis because it identifies elements of democratic 
urban governance which provides a normative framework from which local government 
institutions in Zimbabwe can extrapolate the practice of democratic governance. The UGI graph 
provides accountability, participation, equity and effectiveness as elements of democratic 
governance.  
                                                          
35
 UN-HABITAT-Good Urban Governance Index „Urban Indicators Guidelines: Monitoring the Habitat Agenda and 
the Millennium Development Goals‟ (2004b).  
36
 UN-HABITAT-Good Urban Governance Index (2004b).  
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Adapted from the UN-Habitat-Good Urban Governance Index (2004).  
2.7.1.2 Relevance and legal force 
 
Although the UN-Habitat Good Urban Governance Index is not a binding document, it provides 
a normative framework for democratic local governance in local councils. The UN-Habitat 
provides a self-assessment framework for cities and a platform on which assessment of 
performance of local governance structures and instruments can be based.  From the framework 
countries are able to draw critical features of local democratic representative governance.  
2.7.1.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
As indicated above, the Urban Governance Index presents several normative elements that 
constitute democratic governance practice in general and representative governance in particular. 
It can be noted that the elements encapsulated in the UGI index are accountability, participation, 
equity and effectiveness. All these elements are components of representative governance.
37
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The Index provides that democratic local governance should be accountable to the local 
community. Accountability is also promoted through independent audits as well as monitoring 
by higher tiers of government. Public officials must abide by codes of conduct, avoid corrupt 
practices and receive public complaints.
38
 To promote transparency, anti-corruption institutions 
and disclosure of incomes for local council officials should form part of the accountability 
processes.  
 
The UGI graph puts emphasis on participation as a vital component of democratic governance. 
Participation in local governance should be through election of councillors by residents. The 
Index encourages local authorities to strive for gender balance in the composition of local 
authorities. The graph provides that equity is of paramount importance in democratic governance 
where the election of local leadership is in recognition of the role of women and other 
marginalised groups in decision making processes. The involvement of communities in 
establishing citizen charters and formulation of pro-poor policies provides an opportunity for 
citizens to be part of the governance process. The Index also presents effectiveness as the 
beneficial utilisation of resources to ensure transparency in financial transactions. Lastly the UGI 
index recognises the role that civil society organisations can play in ensuring accountability by 
public institutions and officials. The UGI exhorts local authorities to make available 
communication channels by way of citizen charters, thereby acknowledging citizens‟ right of 
access to basic services.
39
  
2.7.2 United Cities and Local Governments 
2.7.2.1 Background and purpose 
 
The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) is an amalgamation of the International 
Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the United Towns Organisations and Metropolis 
(UOTM).
40
 The UCLG is the largest local government forum in the world that brings together 
different towns and cities across the globe. Together the UCLG Committee and other affiliates of 
the UCLG provide a forum where local government institutions deliberate on local government 
                                                          
38
 UGI (2004). 
39
 UGI (2004). 
40
 UN-Habitat-United Cities and Local Governments‟ (2011). 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
best practices and the implementation of such practices in different cities and towns across the 
globe. The UCLG provides a forum for setting norms and standards for the promotion of local 
democracy, self-government and decentralisation. In addition, UCLG helps in mapping ways of 
fostering accountable and transparent local governance through forging linkages between 
communities and NGOs.  
2.7.2.2 Relevance and legal force 
 
The UCLG is a persuasive forum that inculcates the values of norm-setting in cities, towns, 
metropolis and national local government institutions. The UCLG provides a platform for 
mapping programmes that promote representative governance and setting a normative 
framework for democratic governance. Through committees such as the Committee on Social 
Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights, the UCLG is able to influence local 
government policy formulation and making representations on behalf of its affiliates. The UN 
General Assembly has accorded the UCLG an observer status. This means that although the 
UCLG is not a member of the United Nations, it can be invited to observe the deliberation of the 
United Nations.
41
 The UCLG is thus an advisory body to the United Nations on mechanisms to 
promote decentralisation and to deepen local democracy. It also advises the UN on more 
systematic ways to engage with elected representative and authorities at local level as well as on 
principles of local autonomy. Taking cognisance of its advisory role within the UN organs, the 
UCLG can influence policies on local government.  In addition, the UCLG enjoys international 
recognition, with the World Bank and the Global Forum having signed cooperation agreements 
with the UCLG to collaborate in strengthening democratic structures, fighting poverty and 
improving living standards of people. However despite this recognition, the UCLG Constitution 
remains a „soft law‟ but Zimbabwe can still draw from the elements of representative democracy 
provided by the UCLG on the election of local representatives.   
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2.7.2.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The UCLG Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights of the 
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) recognises people‟s right to social inclusion, 
participation and to human rights.
42
 The UCLG Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory 
Democracy and Human Rights recognises the importance of social inclusion. 
43
In this context 
social inclusion implies incorporating all people in the decision making processes. The 
Committee also supports the notion of „the right to the city‟ in which cities have a right to be 
managed by competent individuals democratically elected by residents.
44
  Residents‟ socio-
economic rights are viewed as of paramount importance and should be realised by local 
authorities.
45
 In addition, the Committee provides for the articulation of participatory democracy 
in local government institutions.
46
 The UCLG also recognises the importance of local forums as 
a platform for information exchange among citizens and local authorities. 
It can therefore be noted that the Committee holds that social inclusion and participative 
democracy only make sense as political goals committed to the recognition of civil, political and 
social rights realised through the application of very diverse, institutional and non-institutional 
tools. By this point, the Committee notes that citizens must be regarded as equal and should 
therefore enjoy their political, social and economic rights.
47
 By this statement the Committee 
implies local communities should be regarded as having the right to participate in the social, 
economic and political activities within their communities. For this thesis the Committee‟s 
provisions would imply that democratic governance should incorporate the contribution of 
different actors in governance processes. The fact that the UCLG recognises the existence of 
vulnerable and marginalised groups in society is a vital component of representative democracy. 
The UCLG does not allude to the appointment of local councils in its provision of elements of 
representative democracy. The critical features of democracy that are drawn from the work of the 
Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights include citizen 
participation through electoral processes, inclusion of marginalised groups in decision-making 
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processes, accountable local leadership and decentralisation of decision-making powers to local 
communities.
48
 In addition the UCLG Committee provides for the right of residents to clean and 
well-managed cities.  
2.8 Framework for local governance in Africa 
 
A number of regional instruments on local governance are presented in this section. Some of the 
international instruments are linked to Africa since they have chapters on the African continent. 
An example is the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) which has the United Cities 
and Local Government in Africa (UCLGA) as its African chapter. As such the two institutions 
link their activities. Similarly most African local governments draw from international 
frameworks such as from the UN-Habitat framework on local government. On the African 
region, the instruments, both binding and „soft laws‟ to be explored are the Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT) (1990); the African Union Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2012); the All Africa Ministerial 
Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD); the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa 
(UCLGA); the Victoria Falls Declaration adopted in 1999; the Kigali Declaration of 2006 and 
the Harare Declaration. From each of the instruments the researcher will extrapolate critical 
features of representative democratic governance that will be used in chapter 4 to test section 4 A 
of the Urban Councils Act.   
2.8.1 The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA)  
2.8.1.1 Background and purpose 
 
The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) is a forum of African local 
government institutions and it is guided by a Constitution. The UCLGA was established by the 
leaders of local governments in Africa at the Africities 1 Summit, Abijan, 1998 to spearhead 
local government reforms in most African countries and democratise local government 
institutions.
49
 The General Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of the UCLGA
50
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while the Pan African Council of Local Governments is the policy-making body of the 
organisation.
51
 The researcher discusses elements of representative democracy contained in the 
UCLGA Constitution. 
2.8.1.2 Relevance and legal force  
 
The United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) was established by a Constitution 
as a Pan African international organisation of which the majority of African countries, including 
Zimbabwe, are members.
52
 The UCLGA enjoys the recognition of the African Union and strives 
for a united and strong Africa.
53 
The UCLGA draws its power from the UCLGA Constitution 
which regulates activities of the organisation in seeking to provide a framework for the 
governance of cities and local government in Africa. The UCLGA recognition by the African 
Union enables it have credibility and recognition by member states on the continent, including 
Zimbabwe. 
2.8.1.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The UCLGA is guided by its founding values which are respect for democratic principles, rule 
of law and good governance.
54
 In addition, the Constitution presents the objectives of the 
UCLGA, the most applicable to this thesis being that of seeking to promote democratic 
principles and institutions, popular participation in the processes of governance.
55
 In its 
objectives, the UCLGA also encourages State parties to abide by and/or complement the efforts 
of other regional legislation especially those that seek to promote the observance of human 
rights
56
 such as the African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights as well as the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance which seeks to promote democratic electoral 
principles.
57
 In addition the UCLGA recognises the importance of involving popular 
participation in governance of local authorities as evidenced in the provision that central 
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government should seek to „promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation in the process of governance and good governance generally‟. 58  
Most importantly the UCLGA recognises the importance of decentralisation of power 
from central government to local councils and eventually to communities. This is 
provided in the statement that central governments should seek to „promote the policy of 
decentralisation‟.59 
The critical elements of representative democracy drawn from the UCLGA Constitution 
include decentralisation, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance. As 
a result the promotion of decentralisation of power to local authorities and communities 
forms one of the core components of UCLGA. The study will seek to test the extent to 
which the appointment of special interest councillors in the Zimbabwean context 
complies and/or resonate with the elements of representative governance provided in the 
UCLGA Constitution.  
2.8.2 Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT)  
2.8.2.1 Background and purpose 
 
Unlike most international instruments and initiatives which are spearheaded by national 
government, the Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT) 
was a collaborative initiative by NGOs, grassroots organisations as well as African states.
60
 The 
CPPDT was adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Arusha, 
Tanzania in February 1990. The major objective of the Charter was 
 „to sensitise national governments and the international community to the 
dimensions, dynamics and processes and potential of a development approach 
rooted in popular initiatives and self-reliant efforts‟. 61 
The Charter was established in response to the deterioration of social and economic conditions in 
most African countries from the 1980s onwards. This deterioration of the socio-economic 
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conditions and the closed political systems that characterised most of Africa‟s governance 
structures and institutions in the 1980s led to the „full appreciation of the role of popular 
participation in decision making processes‟.62  
The Charter was therefore meant to seek ways of curtailing the deterioration of the social and 
economic conditions of people on the African continent through empowering them to make 
decisions on matters that affect their lives. Consequently the focus of the CDDPT is rooted in 
adopting a community-centred approach to development and recognises the vital importance of a 
people-based approach to development where communities are part of the governance process at 
all levels and at all times. The CDDPT has provided a blueprint on which participatory 
democratic principles can be strengthened, including empowering people to make informed 
political decisions. Key features of representative democratic governance emanating from the 
CDDPT that will be used to examine section 4 A are participation, inclusiveness, accountability 
and transparency. 
2.8.2.2 Relevance and legal force  
 
The Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CDDPT is „soft law‟. 
Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Charter and as such it is bound by the provisions. The Charter 
calls for popular participation in development and transformation.
63
 It lacks the force of law but 
encourages state parties to make a commitment towards the realisation of the ideals of popular 
participation and democratic governance.  
2.8.2.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (CPPDT) presents 
several elements of democratic representative governance. These include citizen participation 
(popular participation) which highlights the importance of a participatory approach to 
governance. The CPPDT presents popular participation as a fundamental right of the people to 
fully and effectively participate in the determination of the decisions that affect their lives at all 
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levels and at all times.
64
 The Charter asserts the role of popular participation as a determinant 
and assertive ingredient in democracy and recognises that governance is a collaborative effort 
between the citizens, their respective governments as well as the international community.  
Citizens provide a vital cog in the participation continuum and should „be fully involved, 
committed and indeed, seize the initiative‟.65 The Charter urges African governments to provide 
an enabling environment for citizens to freely participate in affairs that affect their lives by way 
of appropriate legislation at different levels of government „to yield space to the people, without 
whom popular participation would be difficult to achieve‟.66  
The CDDPT also recognises the importance of the international community in supporting 
 Indigenous efforts which promote the emergence of a democratic environment 
and facilitate the people‟s effective participation and empowerment in the 
political life of their countries.
67
 
From the CPPDT it can be noted that the instrument presents governance as a collective 
obligation of both the governors and the governed. The CPPDT puts the obligation to facilitate 
popular participation on state parties which are required to create enabling legislation and 
conducive environment for citizens to freely deliberate on political, economic and social 
decision-making processes. State parties are compelled to tolerate differences, accept consensus 
on issues as well as ensure the effective participation of the people and their organisations and 
associations.
68
  
2.8.3 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)  
2.8.3.1 Background and purpose 
 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) came into force on 15 
February 2012 and seeks „to promote adherence by each State Party to the universal values and 
principles of democracy and respect for human rights premised upon the supremacy of the 
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constitution and constitutional order‟.69 The ACDEG is possibly the first comprehensive 
instrument to call for decentralisation and to make it binding on African governments and 
reaffirms Africa's commitment to democracy and the rule of law. The Charter has been credited 
for reaffirming the primacy of the rule of law and calling on state parties to initiate appropriate 
measures, including legislative, executive and administrative actions to bring State Parties' 
national laws and regulations in conformity with the Charter.
70
 Given that the ACDEG is the 
latest of African initiative to democratise governance on the continent, it stands to contribute to 
the strengthening of electoral processes. It should be noted that the thrust of the Charter is on 
„stating the minimum requirements for the observance of democratic principles, and its 
ratification and implementation is imperative to the attainment of peace and security, protection 
of human rights and effective democratic governance in Africa‟71. While the Charter provides for 
democratic principles, it does not specifically allude to the appointment of political leadership.  
2.8.3.2 Legal status and relevance 
 
The ACDEG presents one of the most outstanding efforts by African heads of state to 
democratise local government through either decentralisation or devolution or both. The plethora 
of „soft laws‟ that had existed prior to the enactment of the ACDEG, notably the Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development and Transformation adopted by the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (1990), the Victoria Falls Declaration (1999) as well as the Kigali 
Declaration of 2006 were not enforceable as will be highlighted later under section 2.10. 
Zimbabwe is one of the countries that signed and adopted the instrument in January 2007.
72
 The 
ratification of the Charter in February 2012 comes at a time when states are increasingly coming 
under pressure to democratise different institutions of government, especially local government. 
The ACDEG is therefore a continental effort by African heads of state showing commitment to 
the decentralisation and democratisation of local government. The Charter exhorts  
AU members that accede to the Charter commit themselves to establishing and 
strengthening independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the 
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management of elections, and to ensure that there is a binding code of conduct before, 
during and after the election period 
73
  
Zimbabwe being a signatory to the Charter has an obligation to subscribe and implement the 
guidelines guiding electoral processes contained in the Charter. In addition the ratification of the 
Charter signaled a new era in Africa based on the links between free and fair elections, good 
governance and promotion of the rule of law.
74
  
2.8.3.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The contribution of the ACDEG to local government is that the instrument recognises the 
importance of decentralisation in the governance of communities.  The instrument requires state 
parties to „decentralise power to democratically elected local authorities as provided in national 
laws‟.75 In addition, the Charter reaffirms the importance of free and fair elections and the need 
for political stability in African states.
76
 As a result the instrument seeks to promote best 
practices in the management of elections for purposes of political stability and good 
governance.
77
 The ACDEG recognises the right of communities to contribute to decision-making 
processes through the creation of conditions conducive to citizen participation. The instrument 
identifies transparency, access to information, media freedom and accountability as some of the 
elements that make for democratic governance. In this regard, the instrument requires that states 
should  
 
 promote the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizen 
participation
78
, transparency,
79
 access to information, freedom of the press and 
accountability in the management of public affairs
80
  
 
The ACDEG acknowledges the significance of transparency in the election of public officials, 
which in the case of local government would mean the election of councillors. In addition the 
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instrument compels states to take reasonable measure to ensure that people have access to 
information that would enable them to make informed political decisions. 
It calls upon state parties to enact relevant legislation that promotes and strengthens democratic 
institutions. In this regard it calls upon state parties to „develop the necessary legislative and 
policy frameworks to establish and strengthen a culture of democracy and peace‟. 81 
The ACDEG subscribes to the election of public officials as a democratic way of securing 
political leadership. In summary the Charter calls upon states to conduct of free and fair 
elections, establish good governance structures and promote the rule of law.
82
 
2.8.4 All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) 
2.8.4.1 Background and purpose 
 
The growing realisation and recognition of the importance of local governance has resulted in 
states making concerted efforts and taking initiatives to promote decentralisation. In this regard 
African Ministers of Local Government have established forums and platforms to deliberate on 
ways to promote and enhance local governance. One such forum is the All Africa Ministerial 
Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) which was established in terms of its constitution. 
The AMCOD is a permanent ministerial forum where Ministers in charge of local governance 
map out strategies about enhancing local government structures. Through AMCOD forums 
Ministers responsible for local government in their respective countries deliberate on ways to 
enhance democratic governance and share democratic governance best practices. Most 
importantly the AMCOD initiated the drafting of the African Charter on the Values, Principles 
and Standards of Decentralisation and Local Governance.
83
 Together with the United Cities and 
Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) these two bodies have a specific focus on developing 
common regional standards on sub-national governance and democracy. The AMCOD is 
therefore evidence of commitment by Ministers in charge of local government to share 
experiences on local government best practices. 
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2.8.4.2 Legal status and relevance 
 
The AMCOD is a ministerial grouping and its provision on decentralisation can only be soft law. 
It is guided by a constitution which stipulates ministerial functions in terms of decentralisation of 
local government institutions. The AMCOD is a persuasive instrument that provides a platform 
for ministers of local government to make resolutions on ways of strengthening local democracy. 
The African Union (AU) invites the AMCOD to AU meetings as a way of recognising the 
concerted effort of African government in enhancing local democracy. The AMCOD is in 
regular interaction with the AU during which the African Union and the AMCOD may hold joint 
consultative meetings through their competent organs
84
. Its provisions are not binding on 
member states. 
The decision making process in the AMCOD is by consensus. In this regard the AMCOD 
provides that: 
decisions of the Conference of Ministers are adopted by consensus, or where 
necessary, by the majority of members present. 
85
 
This implies that in the spirit of unity, ministers are bound by the decisions of the AMCOD and 
as such this helps to inculcate a sense of compliance with these decisions. All ministers in charge 
of local government adopt the Constitution through the vote. It is stipulated that:  
   the AMCOD Constitution shall be enforceable as soon as it is adopted by the 
Ministers in charge of decentralisation and local development by a 2/3 (two-
third)  majority of member countries present 
86
 
The AMCOD links decentralisation and local development. 
87
 In addition, through sub-regional 
groups of Ministers responsible for local government, Ministers are able to peer-review each 
other on the extent to which they implement decentralisation programmes in their respective 
countries. Zimbabwe is a member of the AMCOD and as such is bound by the resolutions of the 
Conference.  
                                                          
84
 Constitution of the All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation and Local Development (AMCOD) 
(2008). 
85
 Article 11, AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
86
 Article 22, AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
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 Article 23, AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
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2.8.4.3 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The AMCOD calls upon AU member states to enact defined laws that empower local authorities 
to make decisions that address the challenges in the respective constituencies.  The Constitution 
sets out several objectives of the ACMOD, which include „to promote decentralisation, local 
governance and participation of citizens and social groups in designing and implementing 
development policies‟.88 
This objective places decentralisation at the centre of local governance where citizens are 
given the opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of 
developmental policies. In addition the AMCOD takes cognisance of the importance of 
incorporating civil society in development initiatives and urges state parties to collaborate 
with civil society in this regard to „sensitise all the stakeholders of the civil society to the 
primordial place of decentralisation in the economic, social and cultural development of 
every nation‟.89  
For this thesis the provision on decentralisation would mean that the empowering of 
communities to make decisions on matters that affect their lives and communities is vital for 
local democracy. The AMCOD does not provide for appointment of public officials but points 
out that leadership should undergo the democratic electoral process.
90
 
In conclusion critical features of representative democracy that have been identified 
include decentralisation, community participation, and inclusiveness. The emphasis of the 
AMCOD is decentralisation of local government, and this will be used in chapter 4 to test 
the level of compliance of section 4 A of the UCA to representative democratic practices. 
In addition section 4 A will be tested against the contribution of stakeholders to the 
democratic process as provided by the AMCOD. 
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 Part I (2), AMCOD Constitution (2008). 
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2.8.5 The Kigali Declaration (2006) 
 2.8.5.1 Background and legal status 
 
The Kigali Declaration is a culmination of deliberations by ministers in charge of 
decentralisation and local government held in Kigali (Rwanda) in 2005. The focus of the 
meeting was to provide a road map for decentralisation and the empowerment of local 
communities to participate in decision-making processes.
91
 Zimbabwe took part in the 
deliberations and as such is party to the commitments that were reached at the meeting. 
The resolutions of the Ministerial Conference, which came as a declaration, are a show of 
commitment by participants to the meeting and as such not binding. All the provisions of 
the Kigali Declaration are in the form of „soft law‟ and as such are persuasive and call 
upon participants to commit themselves to the democratisation of local government 
through decentralisation in which central government cedes power to sub-national 
government level. In addition, as „soft law‟ the Declaration provides guidelines to the 
signatories and other states on how to promote and strengthen democratic local 
governance.  
2.8.5.2 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The Kigali Declaration recognises the negative impact of poverty on the promotion of 
democratic local governance structures as well as promoting development. Consequently the 
Declaration considers decentralisation as central to poverty reduction as it states that:  
decentralisation is an essential instrument for consolidation and strengthening of 
democracy, good governance, economic growth and poverty reduction.
92
 
                                                          
91
 Preamble, Kigali Declaration on Leadership Capacity Building for Decentralised Governance and Poverty 
Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (2005). 
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 „Decentralised Governance Challenges‟ Kigali Declaration on Leadership Capacity Building for Decentralised 
Governance and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (2005). 
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In addition the Kigali Declaration calls upon states to enact legislation that provides for 
decentralisation of local government institutions to accommodate community participation in 
decision-making processes of local councils: 
The Declaration further calls upon States to facilitate the enactment of 
 legal and institutional frameworks based on clear decentralisation vision 
containing the effective process of decentralisation and legal instruments that 
determine the pace of commitment to decentralisation 
93
 
The primary elements of representative democratic governance that have been drawn from the 
Kigali Declaration are decentralisation, citizen participation and economic growth and poverty 
reduction and  the need for state parties to enact legislation for the promotion of decentralisation 
of power to local councils.  
2.8.6 The Victoria Falls Declaration 
2.8.6.1 Background and legal status 
 
The Victoria Falls Declaration was the result of deliberations by ministers responsible for local 
government and decentralisation, mayors, and key stakeholders. The Declaration sought to map 
out a shared vision on local government in Africa and to identify action for strengthening further 
local governments in Africa. Adopted in 1999, it is a reaffirmation of Africa‟s commitment to 
decentralisation of central powers to sub-national level and democratisation of the local 
government and was a significant step towards decentralisation. However, just like the Kigali 
Declaration the Victoria Falls Declaration is „soft law‟ and is not binding to signatories but 
depends on the commitment of state parties to adopt the normative framework contained in the 
Declaration. However the Declaration urges sub-saharan African governments to enact and adopt 
legislation that provides for decentralisation and devolution of power to promote local 
democracy.
94
 Given that Zimbabwe was part of the group of states that signed the Declaration, it 
has an obligation to recognise the contents of the Declaration.  
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 Kigali Declaration (2005). 
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2.8.6.2 Critical features of democratic governance 
 
The Victoria Falls Declaration is informed by the principle of devolution for the growth of local 
democracy. Under the Victoria Falls Declaration, the states are required to commit themselves to 
the promotion of democracy and good political governance and enhance the accountability of 
public office holders.
95
 
 In addition the Declaration places importance on decentralisation in local governance and 
recognises the role that communities play in strengthening democratic institutions. Furthermore, 
the Declaration encourages states to enact legislation to:  
  to devolve power and responsibility to lower echelons, promote local democracy and 
good governance, with the ultimate objective of improving the quality of life of the 
people; 
96
  
 be directed towards local government structures, which are representative of, and 
accountable to, all sectors of the local population, including marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups;
97
 
 be directed to levels of local government structures, which enable effective community 
participation in local governance;
98
 
 involve the transfer to local government institutions those powers and functions 
necessary to enable them to: provide services for the local population efficiently and 
effectively 
99
and   
 provide a conducive environment for local economic development;100 
 
In conclusion the Victoria Falls Declaration identified decentralisation, devolution and 
community participation as salient features of democratic governance. In addition the 
Declaration encouraged states to take reasonable measures to ensure that these features of 
democratic governance are provided in legislation. 
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 Article 3 (3). 
96
 Article 3 (3).  
97
 Article 3 (b). 
98
 Article 3 (c). 
99
 Article 3 (d) (i). 
100
 Article 3 (d) (ii). 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
To that effect participants concurred that there was need for decentralisation to take place as a 
way of transforming local government and enhancing accountability and transparency, inclusion 
of marginalised and disadvantaged social groups, effective community participation and to 
enshrine local government in the constitutions of the countries present.
101
 
2.8.7 Summary 
 
While most of the instruments were explored above are „soft laws‟ they do present a blueprint for 
democratisation of local government. In addition they are evident of the level of commitment by 
African states to democratise local government mostly through decentralisation and devolution. 
The different African instruments found common voice in calling upon their governments to 
enact enabling legislation to promote local democracy through electoral processes. The different 
instruments that were explored identified several critical features of representative democratic 
governance. The critical features include community participation, transparency, accountability, 
efficiency, inclusiveness and representative leadership. These features of democratic governance 
extrapolated from the instruments will form the basis for testing section 4 A of the Urban 
Councils Act to establish the extent to which it resonates with democratic practices. 
 In the following section, the study discusses the Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee 
(COPAC) constitutional provisions on local government. The COPAC draft is vital for this study 
because it is a result of public consultations and is the first document to provide local 
government as an institution with constitutionally-protected powers.  
 
2.8.8 The Zimbabwe Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) Draft Constitution  
2.8.8.1 Introduction   
 
The political and economic crises of the 1990s and the disputed elections of 2008 led to the 
signing of the interparty Global Political Agreement (GPA)
102
 in Zimbabwe. The GPA paved 
way for the formation of the government of national unit (GNU) or Inclusive Government in 
                                                          
101
 Article  3(e) (i). 
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2008. The Inclusive Government was provided in the Global Political Agreement as a three-year 
transitional political arrangement during which various political reforms would be implemented, 
including the drafting of a new constitution 
103
 for Zimbabwe. This is how the COPAC draft 
came into being after nation-wide public consultations by an interparty parliamentarian 
committee- the Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC). The public consultations commenced 
in July 2010 and went on until March 2011. During the period from April 2011 up to July 2012, 
members of the COPAC undertook the task of writing up the constitutional draft by interpreting 
findings from public consultations. The document that culminated from these public 
consultations came to be known as the COPAC draft constitution. However, the draft 
constitution is yet to be taken to a referendum, presumably in March 2013 after which elections 
would be held. This section provides a detailed discussion of local government provisions of the 
COPAC draft contained in section 14 
104
 which, if adopted, will become law and will transform 
the local government system in Zimbabwe. Given that there are prospects that the COPAC draft 
is the prospective constitution of Zimbabwe, it is being explored in this thesis to determine the 
extent to which it provides for representative local governance. A comparative analysis of the 
COPAC draft provisions on local government and those extrapolated from different instruments 
will be used to test the extent to which section 4A of the Urban Councils Act complies with 
critical features of representative governance.   
2.8.8.2 Unpacking the COPAC draft on local councils 
 
This section unpacks elements of local governance that are provided in the COPAC draft to 
prepare for a comparative analysis of these COPAC draft elements of representative democratic 
governance to section 4A of the Urban Councils Act to establish the extent to which section 4A 
of the UCA complies with the requirements of representative democratic governance. The 
COPAC draft gives a detailed description of local government in four sections under the 
following headings: Devolution of Governmental Powers and Responsibilities;
105
 Urban Local 
Authorities;
106
 Functions of Local Authorities;
107
 and Elections and Local Authorities.
108
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2.8.8.3 Devolution of Governmental Powers and Responsibilities  
 
Under devolution, the COPAC draft exhibits the desire to reform local government by 
empowering local councils and enhance their autonomy. The provisions on devolution in the 
COPAC draft present a first attempt in Zimbabwe to provide constitutionally protected 
powers of local government institutional and legislative frameworks. In addition, the 
comprehensive provision of local government in the COPAC draft provides for structures and 
institutions that should comprise the new local government system in the country. Most 
importantly, the COPAC draft provides for devolution of powers from central government to 
local communities.  In this regard the COPAC draft provides that: 
 governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to provinces and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities 
efficiently and effectively. 
109
   
In addition, the COPAC draft recognises the right of communities to manage their own affairs 
for developmental purposes. This is stipulated in the provision that it is mandatory  
“to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development” 110  
The COPAC draft is different to all constitutional and legislative provisions in the history of the 
country because it recognises the right of communities to contribute to local democracy 
primarily through the election of local council officials. The draft presents local governance as 
seeking “to enhance citizen participation in local governance”111.  
This is stated in the provision that  
“to give powers of local government to the people and enhance their participation in the 
exercise of State powers in making decisions that affect their lives”112. 
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 S 14.13, COPAC draft (July 2012). 
108
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109
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No other legislative or constitutional framework in the constitutional history of Zimbabwe 
ever provided for the ceding of State powers to communities and the incorporating of 
communities in the decision-making processes through electing local leadership. The COPAC 
draft recognises the importance of devolution by empowering local councils and local 
communities through the 
“transfer [of] responsibilities and resources from national government in order to 
establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan and local 
authority”113 
2.8.8.4 Urban Local Authorities  
 
The COPAC draft makes specific reference to urban local governance. It provides that the 
primary purpose of urban local councils is to represent and manage the affairs of people in 
urban areas.
114
 In addition, the provision recognises the importance of elected councillors in the 
management of urban council affairs by stating that 
 “urban local authorities are managed by councils composed of councillors elected by registered 
voters in the areas concerned”115  
This provision does not make any reference to the appointment of councillors by local 
communities or councils. This provision reaffirms the need for community participation in the 
election of local leadership. 
2.8.8.5 Functions of Local Authorities  
 
This is one of the most important provisions of the COPAC draft with regard to the 
establishment of autonomous local councils. The draft provides for the creation of autonomous 
local councils as the draft recognises that: 
“a local authority has the right to govern on its own initiative, the local affairs of the 
people within the area for which it has been established, and shall have all the powers 
necessary for it to do so”116 
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 The provision is confirmation that the COPAC draft recognises the importance of autonomy of 
local authorities. In addition this provision recognises and acknowledges the importance of 
investing power in local authorities to represent their interests. In addition the draft recognises 
that locally-elected leadership understands community needs although in reality this might not be 
the case. The draft does not make provision for the appointment of councillors local by 
communities. 
2.8.8.6 Elections and Local Authorities 
 
The COPAC draft recognises the importance of locally-elected councillors in local councils and 
stipulates when (and how) as well as under what circumstances these should be elected into 
office.
117
The draft reaffirms the view that councils should be established for every locality and 
that the respective communities should be responsible for the election of local council officials to 
administer the affairs of the communities.
118
 The COPAC draft also recognises the fact that 
mayors should be appointed by those councillors elected to represent different wards in council. 
119
 
2.8.8.7 Overview 
 
The COPAC exhibits elements of democratic governance, providing for the election of local 
councillors as well as mayors and other public office bearers. The COPAC draft also recognizes 
the role of communities in determining the choice of local leadership. The draft also recognises 
the significance of elections and elected leadership. Most importantly devolution is provided for 
as acknowledgement transfer of power and functions should help to facilitate participation of 
communities in decision making processes with limited central government intervention. 
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2.8.8.8 Summary of provisions of international instruments and the COPAC draft 
 
The study has explored different international and regional instruments as well as the COPAC 
draft to establish a normative framework for representative democratic governance. Below is a 
table presenting a summary of the critical features of representative democratic representative 
governance. The table presents those critical features of democratic representative governance 
that apply to Zimbabwe and legislative framework to which Zimbabwe is a member of affiliate. 
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Instrument Summary of provisions and 
critical features of representative 
governance 
Elements of representative 
governance 
Relevance for Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
UN Habitat-Good 
Urban Governance 
Index (UGI) 
-provides an index and regulatory 
framework for good local 
governance and seeks to establish 
how local action can improve the 
quality of urban governance. 
-advocates for human rights, non-
discrimination and inclusion, gender 
equity and marginalised groups.  
 
Calls for elected councillors 
and elected mayors who 
should be accountable to the 
communities who elected 
them into office 
 
 
 
 
 
Should align its local government in 
accordance with the UGI in coming up with 
councillors 
 
Zimbabwe is a member of the UN-Habitat 
Charter for Popular 
Participation in 
Development and 
Transformation 
(CPPDT) 
-advocates for a participatory 
approach to governance 
 
 
Calls for full appreciation of 
the role of popular 
participation in decision 
making processes 
 
Should consider role of residents in 
appointment of councillors 
 
Zimbabwe is a member and is bound by the 
terms of the Charter 
African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections 
and Governance 
(ACDEG) 
-encourages democratic governance 
through transparent electoral 
processes  
Provides for decentralisation 
of  power to democratically 
elected local authorities as 
provided in national laws 
 
 
Local authorities should be elected by local 
communities  
Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Charter and is 
obliged to abide its terms 
All Africa Ministerial 
Conference on Decentr. 
 
-advocates for devolution of 
government structures 
 
Calls for decentralisation 
and  
deepening of local 
democracy 
 
It is imperative to deepen local democracy 
through decentralisation and devolution 
Zimbabwe is a participant 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Instrument 
Summary of provisions and 
critical features of representative 
governance 
Elements of representative  
governance 
 
 
 
Relevance for Zimbabwe 
 
 
The United Cities and 
Local Governments of 
Africa (UCLGA) 
-advocates for African unity through 
a united local government 
framework and urges nation states 
to enact legislation to promote such 
unity of purpose. 
 
Calls for promotion of 
democratic principles and 
institutions, popular 
participation in governance 
 
 
Popular participation enhances legitimacy for 
local councils 
 
 
Zimbabwe is a member of the UCLGA and 
draws from the recommendations of the body. 
 
 
The Kigali Declaration 
 
- provides for legal and institutional 
frameworks based on clear 
 
-decentralisation and 
devolution of functions to 
different levels of 
government 
 
Should consider decentralisation as the 
cornerstone of local democracy. 
Zimbabwe is a signatory and is obliged to 
comply with terms of the Declaration. 
 
Victoria Falls 
Declaration 
 
 
 
-advocates for limited central 
government interference and in local 
government affairs. 
-advocates for autonomous local 
government based on participatory 
democracy. 
 
 
Recognises the role of local 
communities in 
strengthening local 
democratic institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communities have a role to play in enhancing 
local democratic institutions 
 
 
Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Declaration. 
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Instruments 
 
 
Summary of provisions and 
critical features of representative 
governance 
 
Elements of representative 
governance 
 
 
Relevance for Zimbabwe 
 
 
The Zimbabwe 
Parliamentary Select 
Committee (COPAC) 
Draft Constitution 
-recognises the right of communities 
to manage own affairs 
-devolves powers of local 
governance to local communities as 
a way of enhancing citizen 
participation.  
-places heavy emphasis on 
decentralisation and devolution 
-advocates for democratic, 
transparent and accountable local 
governance. 
 
Calls for devolution of powers to local councils which are elected by local 
residents. 
Urban local authorities are managed by councils composed of councillors 
elected by registered voters in the areas concerned 
 
 
The COPAC draft once passed at the referendum will become a constitution 
with binding provisions. Local government will be presented as an institution 
with constitutionally-protected status 
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2.8.8.9 Values emerging and COPAC Draft  
 
Several critical values of representative democratic governance have emerged from the 
exploration of international instruments and the COPAC draft. The common elements of 
representative governance identified are: decentralisation/devolution (where power is transferred 
to the sub-national level to make autonomous decisions, local democracy (where local people 
contribute to decision-making processes within their areas), inclusiveness (where every social 
group is involved in making decisions that affect their lives), accountability (local government 
(and its officials-both elected and appointed) should be accountable to the community it serves), 
transparency (where all decisions are clear and apparent), representative leadership (where 
political leadership should represent the needs of the citizens), citizen participation (residents 
should play an active role in decision-making processes).   
 
The different instruments identified devolution as central to the implementation of other critical 
features of representative governance. In addition different instruments have highlighted the 
importance of cultivating local democracy through election of representatives, community 
participation, transparency and accountability. The COPAC draft calls on recognition of special 
interests and equity in democratic governance. Despite the call for devolution and 
decentralisation of functions to local authorities, cooperation between different levels of 
government should exist. Under devolution, the study discusses the fact that powers and 
functions should be transferred to local communities to make decisions that impact on their 
livelihoods. In local democracy, local communities should take part in the election of local 
leadership who should represent those communities. The election of local leadership should be 
transparent. In addition elected leadership should be accountable to local communities whose 
interests they represent. In the election of local leadership, cognisance should be taken of the 
need to represent special interests. The composition of the elected leadership should also be 
inclusive of marginalised groups. Effectiveness and efficiency are components of democratic 
governance which help in achieving development. In local governance effectiveness and 
efficiency seek to ensure that objectives benefit communities through economic use of resources. 
In the different instruments, it was noted that cooperation between the different spheres of 
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government help in effective implementation of policies. It is on the basis of these values that the 
practice and implementation of section 4 A will be tested to establish the extent to which it 
complies with international benchmarks as provided by different instruments and the COPAC 
draft. The next chapter unpacks the provisions of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act to 
establish the extent to which the practice and implementation of legislation complies with 
representative democratic governance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE AND THE 
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST COUNCILLORS 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This section discusses local government system in Zimbabwe. Most importantly this section 
discusses the local government system in Zimbabwe, local government structures and 
institutions, local councils in rural and urban areas, the election of local council officials as well 
as political leadership. This chapter discusses the background to the appointment of special 
interest councillors and the content, practice and implementation of section 4 A of the Urban 
Councils Act. The chapter then unpacks the content of the legislation and the extent to which the 
practice and implementation of the legislation impacts on democratic governance.  The thrust of 
this section is on the role of local council leadership (appointed or elected) and how they impact 
on local autonomy and representative democratic governance. The emphasis of this chapter is to 
discuss different parts of section 4 A. 
3.2 Local government system in Zimbabwe 
 
The history of local government in Zimbabwe dates back to the 1890s with the arrival and 
subsequent colonisation of the country by the British South Africa Company (BSAC). This is 
besides the existence of traditional forms of local government systems that were presided over by 
traditional chiefs. The control of local populations and Native Councils was done through the 
enactment of different pieces of legislation and the establishment of different structures and 
institutions.
120
 Different legislation for controlling rural and urban areas were enacted, but the 
most important was how the increasing urban population groups were to be controlled and 
services provided in growing townships.
121
 Hence the first legislation and structures for the 
control and provision of services was implemented in urban areas with those pertaining to rural 
areas being enacted later. The first local government structure was the Salisbury Sanitary Board, 
established in 1891 under the Ordinance 2.  Other advisory boards came later in different urban 
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areas to provide a strict monitoring mechanism for African affairs. All the advisory boards fell 
under the direct control of the District Commissioner.
122
 These structures „laid the foundation for 
a highly centralised system of local governance based on white supremacy policies and 
characterised by the imposition of sub-standard and centrally-defined programmes on Africans 
and Native Councils‟.123 To further institutionalise white control of Native affairs, a plethora of 
other local government legislation was to follow. These included the Matabeleland Order in 
Council (1894), the Municipal Law (1897), the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Municipal 
Act (1930) and the Urban Councils Act (1973). Through these different pieces of legislation, 
central government was able to monitor and control operations of local councils and Advisory 
Boards. Although Advisory Boards were established in African townships played a purely 
consultative role, they were not intended to empower the local authorities or residents.
124
 This 
plethora of legislation signaled the commitment of the colonial administration to entrench their 
control of indigenous population. The predominant characteristic of these pieces of legislation 
was the level of control of central government over local affairs.  
3.2 Post colonial local government system and administration 
 
This section unpacks the different structures and institutions that comprise local government in 
Zimbabwe. The issues that will be discussed are the local government institutions that administer 
urban and rural affairs, numbers of personnel involved with local government administration, the 
electoral system in local government, powers and responsibilities of different structures and 
institutions, as well as significant institutions such as mayors and managers. 
3.2.1 Local government institutions  
 
The post-colonial system of local government in Zimbabwe inherited elements of colonial local 
government system, notably the classification of rural and urban, governed through rural and 
urban councils. These local government institutions are governed through the Urban Councils 
Act and the Rural and District Councils Act respectively. At independence the new dispensation 
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sought to reform local government by creating a single local government Ministry and 
amalgamating former African councils into district councils and urban councils. In addition, new 
local government legislation was enacted for district councils and urban councils, namely the 
Rural District Councils Act
125
 and the Urban Councils Act
126
 respectively. The new legislation 
and institutional framework retained the central government stronghold on local authorities.
127
  
Additional specialised subsidiary legislation was enacted to strengthen central government‟s grip 
on local authorities as well as on citizens in general. Some of the subsidiary legislation included 
the Chiefs and Headmen Act
128
, Communal Land Act
129
, the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act, the Customary Law and Local Courts Act
130
 and the Traditional Leadership 
Act.
131
 The implementation and practice of each of the legislation falls directly under the control 
of the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). The 
MLGRUD oversees the implementation of all the above-mentioned local government legislation. 
Taking charge of all the above pieces of legislation has enabled the MLGRUD to exercise 
enormous executive power over all local government activities and local council operations and 
facilitating central government‟s grip on local councils.  
3.2.2 Urban Councils 
 
Urban councils administer the affairs of urban areas. Currently there are 30 urban councils in the 
country. Urban councils are arranged in hierarchical order. Those in level 1 are city councils (7), 
level 2 are municipalities (9), and level 3 are town councils (10). Lastly those in level 4 are local 
boards (4). Legislation provides for the establishment and upgrading of urban councils to the 
next level.
132
 The upgrading of urban councils is done by the Minister in terms of legislation.
133
 
Urban councils are empowered to make bylaws that regulate socio-economic activities within 
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their area of jurisdiction, in terms of existing legislation.
134
 The bylaws may regulate the 
provision of health and education, as well as other aspects of service delivery, including housing 
and the provision of water.
135
 In all these functional areas, councillors play a pivotal role to link 
up council residents with the local council and to represent the interest of residents in council. 
Councils are composed of both elected ward councillors and appointed special interest 
councillors.
136
 To facilitate participation in local council debates and to better transact business, 
councils establish specialised administrative committees to deal with different aspect of local 
governance.
137
 Committees such as Health, Finance, Housing, Environmental, are some of the 
common structures that exist in different urban (and even rural) councils. 
3.2.3 Rural District Councils 
 
Rural and district councils are established in terms of legislation.
138
 These councils administer 
the affairs of rural districts across the country. There are a total of 60 district councils across the 
country. The current district councils are a result of the amalgamation of former African and 
European Councils that existed in rural areas before 1980 in line with democratic requirements 
of inclusiveness and equity among racial groups. Among the major functions of rural district 
councils include the demarcation of ward and constituency boundaries, imposing taxes in terms 
of legislation.
139
 In addition, just like urban councils, rural district councils have powers to make 
bylaws for the administration of the affairs of district areas.
140
 However the stronghold of central 
government on the operations of rural district councils is reflected by the fact that the Minister 
may dissolve such councils in the event of any irregularities such as maladministration or 
corruption and appoint a Commission to run the affairs of the affected rural councils in terms of 
legislation.
141
 Just like urban councils, rural district councils are managed by elected councillors 
                                                          
134
 S 102,145,227 & 232, Urban Councils Act. 
135
 S 228, Urban Councils Act. 
136
 S 4 (1), Urban Councils Act.  
137
 224 (50, Urban Councils Act. 
138
 S 8, Rural and District Councils Act [Chapter 29:13]. 
139
 S 6, Rural and District Councils Act. 
140
 S 88, Rural and District Councils Act . 
141
 S 207 (1), Rural and District Councils Act. 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
in addition to appointed special interest councillors.
142
 Just like in urban councils, rural councils 
have specialised committees that facilitate participation of councillors in council business.  
3.2.4 Elections of local council officials 
 
Elections play a vital role in determining local leadership of local councils. All electoral 
processes in the country including local government elections are conducted by the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission.
143
 All electoral process in the country have been harmonised and as such 
are carried out simultaneously for all different levels of government. The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Act oversees the conduct of elections, including the election of councillors. Local councils are 
composed of ward councillors by elected by residents and special interest councillors appointed 
by MLGRUD in terms of legislation.
144
 Below is a discussion of the election and appointment of 
local council councillors. 
Elected councillors are elected by residents in the wards where the incumbents reside.
145
 The 
incumbents are elected to represent the interest of those in their constituencies or wards.  The 
appointed councillors can either be caretaker councillors
146
 or special interest councillors.
147
 In 
both cases of appointed councillors, the appointed councillors are appointed based on their 
expertise or skill in a designated interest area. Caretaker councillors are appointed by the 
Minister in urban areas not exceeding three councillors where there are no elected councillors or 
the incumbent has been suspended, imprisoned or due to ill-health.
148
 The caretaker councillors 
may be appointed on a temporary basis to take charge of a council ward whether or not the 
individual qualifies to be appointed. The qualifications for appointment as a caretaker councillor 
include owning immovable property in the municipality such as a house or business.
149
 In some 
cases, the MLGRUD may dispatch its own officials until new councillors are elected to fill the 
vacancy.
150
 The other group of appointed councillors is known as special interest councillors and 
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just like caretaker councillors, these are appointed on the basis of skill or expertise in a specific 
area of relevance to local government. Those appointed on the basis of possession of skills is in 
recognition of the possible contribution that the incumbents can make in local councils to 
represent the interest of designated groups, such as those in business, disabled and gender. Those 
appointed on the basis of expertise possess professional credentials that enable them to 
competently represent the interest of their designated fields, such those in education, legal and 
medical fields. This means that the appointment is at the discretion of the Minister. The practice 
of appointing special interest councillors and the implementation of the relevant legislation is the 
focus of this thesis.  
One of the most important elected council officials are mayors who are elected from among 
elected councillors at the first sitting of council in terms of legislation.
151
 Councillors are either 
elected or appointed. In terms of legislation once ward councillors are elected, they may then 
elect a mayor
152
 and deputy mayor
153
 from among them. The position of mayor used to be an 
executive portfolio but changes to local government legislation
154
 rendered the portfolio 
ceremonial.
155
 Currently the position of mayor is ceremonial which means that the incumbent 
does not have executive powers to make decisions but has to consult with elected councillors. 
The major functions of the mayor are: 
 to supervise and co-ordinate the affairs of the council concerned; 156  
 control the activities of the employees of the council; 157  
 preside over all meetings of the councils‟ executive committee; 158  
 sign orders, notices and documents that require execution or authentication159 as well as;  
 exercise any function that the council may delegate to him/her.160 
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These functions put the mayor on a crucial position in the implementation of local council 
policies and ministerial directives.  
The details of the appointment of special interest councillors in urban local councils will be 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
3.2.5 Political leadership  
 
In the pre-colonial era, traditional chiefs were the political leadership and were in charge of 
traditional institutions. This formed some form of elementary local government system but 
falling under the direct control of the colonial administration. At independence the new political 
dispensation inherited the centralised local government structure where all major decisions of 
local authorities were directed from the centre. At independence, the new dispensation adopted 
the political party system, which resulted in the politicisation of local government system. The 
politicisation of local government is characteristic of elected leadership in political party systems 
as political parties seek to influence local government policies.  
The politicisation local councils is rooted in ZANU PF‟s desire to influence local government 
policies.
161
 It has also been argued that ZANU PF sought to manipulate its popularity in rural 
areas during the liberation struggle to spearhead its party policies to gain political mileage.
162
 
Having been in power for most of the post-colonial era, ZANU PF set about imposing local 
leadership in local government structures and institutions across the country. In cases where local 
council elections were held, candidates were imposed on residents.
163
  
3.2.6 Local autonomy 
 
Jordan (1984) has noted that the existence of autonomy in local affairs is a sine qua non for 
continued existence of local democracy.
164
 Threats to local autonomy can come either through 
direct interference by central government or through direct interference by the Minister of Local 
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Government.
165
 For example, in terms of existing legislation, the Minister has the power to 
appoint senior staff of councils.
166
 In either way interference curtails local autonomy as 
instructions are handed down from either central government or the Minister. From the 
establishment of the first structures of local government in colonial Zimbabwe, the Salisbury 
Sanitary Board and later the Victoria Advisory Board, it was evident that the concept of local 
autonomy would be difficult to introduce because the Advisory Boards fell under the direct 
control of the District Commissioner. The legislation accompanying these Advisory Boards put 
the District Commissioner at the centre of all local government activities.
167
 The post-colonial 
local government legislation does not much from colonial legislation, as it allowed direct 
interference of the Minister in the local affairs and stifling local autonomy. The appointment of 
special interest councillors originates from the desire by central government to provide strict 
monitoring of local councils by deploying the Minister to make interventions in local council 
operations. These interventions came in the form of being involved in the appointment of senior 
local government personnel, interpretation of statutory instruments and the oversight over the 
general operations of local councils. The wide-ranging delegated powers of the Minister to make 
appointments to „rectify any shortcomings in the local governance system‟168 have resulted in 
additional appointments to local councils. These decisions by the Minister impact on the 
operations of local councils in terms of decision-making and budgetary processes. Below is a 
discussion of one such case of Ministerial interference in local affairs of councils through the 
appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act. 
3.3 Background to the appointment of special interests councillors in local government  
 
The practice of appointing council officials to local councils is not a post-colonial development. 
The practice of appointing council officials is not a recent development in local government. 
From 1891 when the Salisbury Advisory Board was established, the practice of appointing 
council of officials was introduced when in the same year a Board of Management was 
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established to run the emerging town of Salisbury. The Board of Management was composed of 
four elected members and three members appointed by the British South Africa Company which 
was the Company responsible for the administration of the town.
169
 From that time the 
appointment of local council officials has co-existed alongside elected council officials. In the 
current local government system the appointment of special interest councillors has attracted 
much attention and forms the basis for this study. In successive advisory boards, the local 
government systems continued to appoint African councillors to advise the white officers on the 
status of African townships. Since then the appointment of councillors by central government has 
become common practice. The current local government system provides for the appointment of 
special interest councillors in both rural 
170
 and urban councils 
171
 by the MLGRUD.  
 
Although most of Ministerial appointments have not attracted much attention, it was the 
introduction of the appointment of special interest councillors in rural district councils
172
 that 
showed such appointments could be used for political reasons. The appointment of special 
interest councillors became a continuous process of „establishing grassroots participation 
structures, and providing a framework for co-ordinating government institutions‟ participation in 
rural development‟.173 However, it faced a lot of criticism from affected rural communities 
because of lack of transparency.  
Mushamba has argued that despite the fact that decentralisation enhances democracy and 
increases efficiency in service delivery,
 174
 much of the decentralisation process has been 
implemented in rural areas.
175
 In the Zimbabwean case, rural areas have been political 
strongholds for ZANU PF over the years and as such appointing special interest councillors 
would help to consolidate the ZANU PF in rural areas.
176
 Having been in power for long, ZANU 
PF sought to use the same practice of appointing special interest councillors in urban areas to 
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bolster their presence in urban local councils. To be able to appoint special interest councillors in 
urban local councils, central government amended the Urban Councils Act in 2008 to enable the 
Minister to appoint special interest councillors. The section below unpacks the content of section 
4 A and the implication of the provisions for representative democratic governance.   
3.3.1 Background to the enactment of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act  
 
The practice of appointing councillors to local councils has been in existence since the 1980s 
when Zimbabwe attained political independence and was the dominant political party in the 
country. The practice was put in place as part of the post-colonial local government reforms 
initially implemented in rural areas. However the practice was only implemented in district rural 
councils in terms of District and Rural Councils Act
177
. The practice was introduced at a time 
when ZANU PF was the sole political party with very little or no opposition to its hegemony as 
has been discussed above. The appointments were therefore made to consolidate ZANU PF hold 
on political power in rural areas as has been discussed above. The councillors were appointed on 
the basis of expertise and were known as „special interest‟ councillors responsible for specialist 
areas such as the education, health, the disabled, women‟s affairs as well as legal issues.  It 
should be noted that because ZANU PF was the main political party then, it dominated local 
government both in rural and urban councils. It was not until the end of the 1990s that ZANU PF 
began to face a threat to its political hegemony from emerging political parties, notably the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a broad-based political movement which became 
increasingly popular from the 2000 onwards. This emergence of the MDC and its subsequent 
domination of urban councils in the elections that were conducted in the elections of 2000 put 
ZANU PF‟s political hegemony under threat.  
This led to ZANU PF seeking ways of diluting the MDC‟s dominance in urban councils. On the 
eve of the 2008 Harmonised Presidential, Senatorial, House of Assembly and Local Government 
Elections, sensing possible defeat, and vested with much experience in the workings of local 
government, ZANU PF initiated deliberations to amend the Urban Councils Act to incorporate 
the practice of appointing special interest councillors in urban areas. This culminated in the 
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amendment of the Urban Councils‟ Act on 8 April 2008, leading to the enactment of section 4A 
of the Urban Councils Act. 
Through statutory instrument 79/2010 which gave rise to section 4A of the Urban Councils Act, 
the Minister of Local Government is vested with authority to fix the maximum possible number 
of special interest councillors for every urban area, without consulting the residents in the 
ward.
178
 Under this legislation, the MLGRUD makes additional appointments to urban councils. 
The introduction of special interest councillors was based on the policy rationale that the new 
elected councillors need to work alongside experienced individuals and to represent interests of 
marginalised groups in society. In the next chapter the researcher discusses the practice and 
implementation of legislation of appointing special interest councillors by the MLGRUD in 
terms of legislation.
179
 A detailed chronicle of dismissals and suspensions of different councillors 
and mayors presented under Table 1 of the survey is evidence of the power that the Minister 
wields in determining who should be councillor and who should not. 
3.3.2 Provisions of section 4A of the Urban Councils’ Act  
 
The amended section 4A of the Urban Councils Act is made up of three sub-sections. It 
stipulates the quota of appointed special interest councillors in each urban local council. The 
legislation also determines how the incumbents should relate to the MLGRUD. In addition the 
legislation provides the benefits that should accrue to the incumbents in their capacity as 
councillors, although they do not vote. Below is the full provision of section 4 A of the Urban 
Councils Act: 
Subject to this Act, every municipal and town council shall consist of-   
(1) (a) One elected councillor for each ward of the council area; and 
     (b) Such number of appointed councillors representing special interests, not exceeding one-
quarter of the number of elected councillors, as the Minister may fix in respect of the council by 
statutory  instrument, and who shall hold office during the pleasure of the Minister 
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(2) Appointed councillors shall participate in the business of the municipal or town council to 
which they are appointed and perform the same functions and be entitled to the same benefits in 
every respect as if they were elected councillors, except that they shall not have a vote at 
meetings of the municipal or town council concerned. 
3.4 Unpacking section 4A of the Urban Councils Act 
 
In this section the researcher unpacks the implementation of the legislation and how it resonates 
with representative democracy. In the discussion of the legislation, the researcher highlights 
elements such as deciding on the numbers to be appointed and elected; selecting candidates for 
appointment based on interest; deciding on tenure of incumbents; and status of appointed special 
interest councillors.  
 3.4.1 Deciding on the Numbers 
 
Section 4A (1) (a) provides for the election of at least one ward councillor for each ward. This is 
in line with representative democracy where residents are able to elect local leadership of their 
choice. This section also recognises the right of residents to elect leaders of their own choice. In 
this section there is no evident influence of the MLGRUD in the election of councillors, or if 
such influence is there, it is limited. Such election of local councillors is legitimate as it is (or 
should be) done in terms of the Zimbabwe Electoral Act.
180
 This in turn stipulates the number of 
councillors to be elected for each ward. This section of the Act is thus important in that it sets the 
foundation on which the number of special interest councillors will be based. However the 
Minister may deviate by going over the 25% threshold since he/she is empowered to fix the 
number of those individuals that may be appointed as special interest councillors.
181
 Once the 
councillors are elected, the Minister would then appoint more than 25% of elected councillors.
182
 
This means that the higher the number of elected councillors in a constituency, the higher the 
possible number of appointed special interest councillors. This element of discretion on the part 
of the Minister to fix the number of appointed councillors could be the reason for different 
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numbers of appointed special councillors in urban councils with the same number of elected 
councillors. It is left to the Minister to determine the number of special interest councillors not 
exceeding one quarter of the elected councillors. This means that the Minister may decide to 
appoint less or an equivalent of a quarter of those elected to council. More details in this regard 
are presented under paragraph 3.4.2 the survey of 20 urban councils which shows different 
numbers of appointed special interest councillors in different local councils.  
3.4.2 Selecting candidates based on expertise    
     
Section 4A (1) (b) calls upon the MLGRUD to make the necessary appointment of individuals 
with the special skills (and in some cases with relevant expertise as with former mayors). 
Although section 4A (1) (b) mandates the MLGRUD to make the appointments, it does not 
provide guidelines or criteria and the process of appointing councillors is left at the discretion of 
the Minister. However practice has shown that the common fields that have been considered as 
special interest areas include skills and expertise (experience) in education, health, the disabled, 
women and other fields that the Minister may from time to time identify. In addition, the 
legislation does not provide for ways to determine the level of skills and/or expertise of the 
appointees. This means that the Minister may appoint anybody as long as according to the 
Minister‟s judgment, the individual is suitable. Thus it is the Minister who makes the final 
decision without being restrained by any statutory criteria. Thus also there is no guarantee that 
the appointed special interest councillors indeed possess the required expertise or indeed 
represent special interests.  
3.4.3 Deciding on the length of the tenure  
 
In addition to providing for the selection of candidates for appointment as special interest 
councillors, section 4A (1) (b) also decides on the length of tenure of the appointees. The 
appointed councillors shall hold office during the pleasure of the Minister.
183
 This means that 
they may operate as long as the Minister wants them to and can be dismissed or have their tenure 
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renewed, whether they are performing well or not. The fate of special interest councillors is thus 
in the hands of the Minister to retain or dismiss them.  
3.4.4 Status of the appointed special interest councillors 
 
Section 4A (2) empowers the appointed special interest councillors to take part in municipal 
business and to perform the same functions as their elected counterparts. The appointees receive 
the same benefits as their elected counterparts, with their salaries being paid by the local 
authority and not by the Minister. However the major difference between appointed and elected 
councillors is that of voting rights. While elected councillors can vote, appointed special interest 
councillors do not have the right to vote. Despite the fact that the appointed special interest 
councillors have no voting rights, they are influential in terms of providing expertise and skills. 
In addition, appointed councillors enjoy the personal recognition of the Minister unlike the 
elected councillors who are chosen by the local communities. Therefore they can be regarded as 
vital to the implementation of policy in local councils due to their expertise and skills in local 
government. 
3.5 Justification for the enactment of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act 
 
It can be noted that section 4A (2) brings up questions of the desirability of special interest 
councillors given that they are non-elected individuals, enjoying similar benefits as their elected 
counterparts. It has been argued that their presence can be important because they contribute to 
debates in councils and help influence policy towards specific interest groups. By virtue of their 
experience and expertise, special interest councillors are necessary to retain continuity of council 
business after the election of new and inexperienced MDC councillors.
184
 It can be noted that 
there are several justifications for the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act. The 
justification for appointing special interest councillors using the practice as a way of promoting 
multi-party democracy, as a bulwark against corruption or as a partisan practice by a dominant 
political party. On the other hands there are political reasons for appointing special interest 
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councillors in urban councils. The two positions will be discussed under separate headings, 
namely „official policy position‟ and „political reasons‟. 
3.5.1 Official policy position 
 
The argument under the official position was that since most of the elected MDC councillors are 
still inexperienced in local governance, they needed to work alongside experienced former 
councillors, hence the need to incorporate experienced councilors mostly from ZANU PF. It 
should be noted that only ZANU PF held the position of councilors in most local councils 
because it was the only dominant political party with no challenges to its rule until 2000 with the 
participation of the MDC in local government elections. The existence of inexperienced 
councillors mostly from the MDC justified the need to appoint special interest councillors. 
3.5.1.1 Need for expertise in local council 
 
During the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act it was argued that the 
appointment of special interest councillors would help to integrate experienced councillors and 
other civic leaders into local councils to strengthen and promote balanced debate. It was 
envisaged that such experienced councillors and civic leaders would draw from their years of 
exposure to local council business. The experience of the appointed councillors would be of help 
to the elected MDC councillors most of whom did not have any prior local government 
experience. Therefore in order to have continuity in local council business the appointment of 
experienced councillors, mostly ZANU PF candidates who had lost in local government 
elections was justified.
185
  
3.5.1.2 Promoting multi-party democracy 
 
It was argued that confining the composition of local councils to elected councillors would limit 
the composition of most local councils to MDC councillors who are usually the preferred 
political party, especially in urban areas. Therefore finding alternative ways of opening up the 
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composition of local councils through incorporating other political parties and constituencies 
without passing through the voting process would enable more voices in local councils.
186
 
Incorporating different social groups would give voice to different sections of the local 
community. Despite the fact that the MDC party had won in most urban councils, but the 
incorporation of individuals from other political parties would facilitate the cross fertilisation of 
ideas in local councils and a culture of tolerance among different political parties. It was 
envisaged that having one political party in council would not be in the spirit of multi-party 
democracy. The appointment of special interest councillors coming from different political, 
social and economic backgrounds would not only enrich the debates and expertise within local 
councils, but would also promote multi-party democracy.
187
 In addition, the appointment of 
different social interest groups within local councils would ensure representation of different 
social groups. Bringing in specific groups such as women, the disabled and youth would ensure 
the representation of their interest in local government policy formulation and implementation. 
Appointing special interest councillors for these and other groups would also enable local 
councils to make informed policy decisions that serve the interests of different groups.  
3.5.1.3 Bulwark against corruption and protection of residents 
 
It was argued that special interest councillors were appointed to provide checks and balances on 
the performance and activities of elected councillors from the same political parties who might 
want to engage in corrupt practices.
188
  
There were also claims by the MLGRUD that the enactment and subsequent implementation of 
section 4A was necessitated by central government‟s desire to protect residents from councillors. 
The MLGRUD justified the intervention in local councils as seeking to „protect residents‟ from 
the excesses of inexperienced MDC councillors.
189
 This is the official version of what the 
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Minister presents as the justification for making additional appointments to urban councils that 
are dominated by the MDC councillors elected in their respective wards.
190
   
However despite the official rationale for the appointment of special interest councillors, there 
are those who view such appointments as being done for political reasons.  
3.5.2 Political reasons 
 
Apart from the official  policy position which states that experienced former councillors should 
be appointed by the Minister as a way of inserting expertise and skills, there is also another 
position (herein the political position) which argues that in enacting section 4A and appointing 
special interest councillors, the MLGRUD has political motives as discussed below.  
3.5.2.1 Capitalising on the inexperience of the MDC in local governance to enact the piece 
of legislation 
 
One of the most puzzling issues is how the MDC could have allowed the enactment of Section 4 
A when it was evident that it not only empowered the MLGRUD but that it would be used to 
against the MDC elected councillors. There are possibilities that the euphoria of prospects of 
winning all electoral processes in the election which were to be help in 2008 overwhelmed the 
MDC legislators to the extent that they saw no need to delay the amendment of the Urban 
Councils Act. It could also be that the lack of local government experience and the meaning and 
impact of local government legislation could have contributed to this oversight on the part of the 
MDC. In 2006 when section 4A first became operational in urban local councils, ZANU PF had 
been in government for over 26 years while the MDC had never been in government as a sole 
party. As such it lacked government experience and tended to take things for granted, including 
the possible impact of section 4 A on the operations of urban local councils dominated by the 
MDC.  
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3.5.2.2 Using the appointed special interest councillors as spies for the MLGRUD 
 
Given that most councillors in both urban and rural councils are from the MDC the Minister may 
have sought, through appointed special interest councillors, to gather information on what would 
be going on in urban councils. With different political parties in local councils as well as experts 
in different fields, these councillors would also check on each other‟s performances and such 
practice would most likely limit corrupt tendencies. It may be that the MLGRUD have used the 
appointment of special interest councillors to gather intelligence on the proceedings in urban 
local councils.
191
 This argument has been expressed by the media as the major reason behind the 
suspension and dismissal of MDC councillors on the pretext that there are either corrupt or 
incompetent. It would only be through some of the councillors in councils that the Minister 
would be knowledgeable about deliberations in local councils. As a result appointed special 
interest councillors could be the most likely source of information for the Minister for him to be 
able to decide who to suspend and eventually dismiss for „maladministration‟ or 
„mismanagement‟ subjective terms which cannot be quantified.192   
3.5.2 3 Using the appointment of special interest councillors as a way of discrediting the 
MDC 
 
In addition to using special interest councillors to gather intelligence the study has also noted that 
the appointment of special interest councillors could mostly be used to discredit the MDC which 
dominate most urban local councils. The dominance of the MLGRUD in local council decision-
making processes and operations of all local authorities could have been used to frustrate the 
efforts of elected MDC councillors in their endeavours to execute projects in their constituencies 
and subsequently curry favour with residents and eventually put the name of their political party-
ZANU PF in good public standing. As a result of rampant suspension and dismissal of elected 
MDC councillors, many projects have not been completed. The deterioration of services against 
the backdrop of the regular suspension of elected councillors has portrayed the MDC elected 
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 The Elected Councillors‟ Association of Zimbabwe (ECAZ) „Chombo uses councilors as spies‟ The 
Zimbabwean, 7 August 2012.  
192
 Media reports have highlighted that there has been regular suspension and subsequent dismissal of MDC elected 
councillors as mayors as cited by the Combined Harare Residents‟ Association (see Shumba 2012:2). 
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councillors as incompetent and accuses them of being unsuitable to hold public office. By such 
behaviour, the MLGRUD seeks to weaken the MDC as a political party and discredit elected 
MDC councillors.  
The fact that the Minister does not appoint special interest councilors in some urban councils 
such as in Kwekwe and Chinhoyi could be that there is no provision that sets timeframes for 
such appointments to be made. This lack of a timeframe calling upon the Minister to make the 
appointment of special interest councillors could lead to hasty appointment of individuals with 
no expertise to offer. 
3.6 Summary 
 
The local government system in Zimbabwe has been characterised by the domineering role of 
central government over local affairs. This domineering role of central government has also 
frustrated cooperation between the centre and local authorities. Through pieces of legislation, the 
centre has been able to control and monitor local councils. 
The chapter unpacked the contents of section of 4A of the Urban Councils Act. The discussion of 
the content of section 4 A indicated that the legislation provides for the election of ward 
councillors, appointment of special interest councillors to provide skills and expertise. In 
addition, the legislation empowers the MLGRUD to decide on the length of tenure and status of 
the appointed councillors. In all these provisions the MLGRUD plays a decisive role. The 
implementation of section 4A is a subjective decision by the Minister. There are no guidelines to 
direct the Minister on whom to appoint, for how long and to whom such appointees should be 
accountable. The official justification of appointing special interest councillors has been to 
augment the work of the elected councillors and to insert skills and expertise through appointing 
experienced individuals. In addition in this chapter the study presented political reasons that 
assumed to be behind the appointment of special interest councillors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARING THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST 
COUNCILLORS AGAINST NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS AND THE COPAC DRAFT 
4.1 Introduction  
 
From the exploration of international instruments and the COPAC draft in Chapter 2, different 
values of representative democratic governance emerged. These are devolution and limits to 
central government interference; elements of local democracy, notably election of 
representatives, community participation, transparent decision-making and accountable 
leadership as well as effectiveness and efficient decision making. In realising these values there 
should be cooperation between different levels of government. In this chapter the researcher will 
establish the extent to which the implementation and practice of section 4 A complies with these 
values drawn from the international instruments and the COPAC draft. In order to assess 
practice, a sample survey of 20 urban local councils is presented below and discussed. This list is 
used to establish the extent to which section 4 A complies with the critical features of 
representative governance drawn from international instruments and the COPAC draft.  
4.2 An analysis of the practice of appointing special interest councillors in terms of section 
4A 
 
The researcher undertook a survey of 20 urban councils to establish the practice and 
implementation of section 4 A. In addition the study analyses the level of consistency in the 
appointments with the quota provided in section 4A (1) (b) of section 4 A.  
4.3 Special interest councillors in selected urban councils  
 
The researcher uses results of a survey of selected local councils to analyse the composition of 
the appointed special interest councillors in terms of gender, political party alignment as well as 
the skills that they have, as presented in the table below.  
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City/ Town 
 
 
Elected 
 
 
Appoint
ed 
                                            Remarks 
 
Gender  
 
Party 
alignment 
 
 
Special interests 
 
 
 
Special skill/expertise 
 
 
% special interest  councillors 
(approx.) 
M F ZANU 
PF 
MDC    
Bulawayo 29 7 7 - 7 - All rejected by 
residents 
i
 
unconfirmed 25% 
Chinhoyi 15 1 - 1 1 - unconfirmed unconfirmed 7% 
Gweru 18 4 4 - 4 - 1 resident assoc.     
1 disabled 
1 commerce  1 education 22% 
Kadoma 17 4 1 3 4 - - 1 male-former mayor      3 females 1 medical 
doctor, 1 education, 1  media 
24% 
Kwekwe 14 0 - - - - Minister made 
NO appointment 
no appointments made 0% 
Marondera 12 3 2 1 3 - - 1former ZANU PF  mayor, 1 former ZANU PF 
dep. mayor, 1 former ZANU finance chair 
25% 
Mutare 18 4 4 - 4 - 1business 1 legal,1 finance,1 admin 22% 
Redcliff 9 2 2 - 2 - 1 business 1 artisan 22% 
Shurugwi 13 - - - -  no appointment No appointment 0% 
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Victoria 
Falls 
11 1 1 - - 1 1 business - 9% 
Harare 46 11 9 2 11 - 1 disabled, 1 
residents assoc 
1 business, 8 former ZANU PF councillors 24% 
Gwanda 11 2 2 - 2 - 1 business 1former ZANU PF councillor 18% 
Kariba  9 1 1 - 1 - - 1 former ZANU PF mayor 11% 
Karoi 10 3 2 1 3 - - 3 former ZANU PF councillors 30% 
Zvishavane  12 2 1 1 2 - 1 business 1 former ZANU PF councillor 17% 
Masvingo  17 3 2 1 3 - 1 disabled                    
1 business 
1 education 18% 
Rusape 13 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 former (ZANU PF) councillor, 1 education 15% 
Chegutu 15 1 1 - 1 -  1 former (ZANU PF) mayor 
 
7% 
Bindura 8 2 2 - 2 - - 2 former (ZANU PF) councillors 25% 
Chitungwiza 23 4 4 - 4 - 1 business 1 former mayor, 2 former (ZANU PF) councillors, 17% 
TOTAL 320 57 4
6 
1
1 
55 2 13 interests 44 skills/expertise  18% 
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4.4 Summary of salient aspects of the composition special interest councillors 
 
The summary discusses political affiliation, gender, special interest areas, and skills of the 
appointed councillors.  From a total of 320 elected councillors in 20 urban areas, 57 were 
appointed as special interest councillors. This represents 18% of the total elected councillors. 
This is less than the stipulated 25% quota for special interest councillors. It should be noted that 
the Minister has the right to determine the number of special interest councillors as long as it 
does not exceed 25% of those elected by residents.  
The researcher has observed that the thrust of the appointments seems to be tilted towards skills 
and expertise more than the representation of special interests. What is of importance in the 
composition of this table is the fact that there are more special interest councillors appointed on 
the basis of their skills or experience in a designated field than those representing special interest. 
This implies the thrust is more on expertise and experience than on representation of special 
interest groups such as the disabled and women. From the table above it can be noted that the 
number of representation of interests is 13 which represents 23%. On the other hand the number 
for skills and expertise is 44 which represent 77%. This can be interpreted to mean that it is not 
about representation of special interests but skills and expertise which implies that the focus of 
the Minister is to insert skills and expertise among the elected councillors.  
4.4.1 Percentage of councillors from ZANU PF 
The researcher has observed a trend in which most appointed special interest councillors are 
losing ZANU PF candidates. The composition of the special interest councillors shows that there 
more councillors affiliated to ZANU PF that those from the MDC. Out of the 57 appointed 
special interest councillors, 55 are from ZANU PF which represents 96% of the total of 
appointed special interest councillors. This inclination towards the appointment of ZANU PF 
councillors by a ZANU PF Minister suggests that the appointments are being used to serve a 
political purpose more than inserting skill and expertise in local councils. From the evidence 
presented by the survey it can be argued that the MLGRUD may be using the appointment of 
special interest councillors to reward political associates. This is even more evident in that 
almost all appointed special interest councillors belong to ZANU PF which happens to be the 
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political party of the MLGRUD.
193
 It could therefore be concluded that the appointees are not 
only close associates of the Minister, but the practice of appointing individuals without and set 
criteria could promote nepotism and patronage. The appointment as special interest councillors 
could also be consolation for ZANU PF losing candidates for having braved the political storm 
against popular MDC candidates. Although it can be blamed on the absence of criteria for 
appointing special interest councillors, there are chances that could be appointing political 
associates as special interest councillors. 
4.4.2 Percentage of female appointees  
 
From the picture given by the composition of appointed special interest councillors derived from 
the table above, it suggests that the appointment does not seem to consider gender equity or 
representation. From a cumulative total of 57 appointed special interest councillors, only 11 are 
women while 46 are male. This percentage of women to men is approximately 24%. This is 
despite the fact that women are generally under-represented in most areas and more women 
would have been appointed under „interest‟ to increase the representation of women. It could be 
argued that the appointment of very few female special interest councillors shows the negative 
impact of lack of guidelines which has led to arbitrary appointments without due regard for 
gender equity.   
4.4.3 Percentage of the disabled 
 
While it can be acknowledged that the disabled are a special interest area and that more 
representation is necessary, this could be achieved by appointing at least one for representative 
for each of the local councils. This representation of the disabled is very small, given that out of 
a total of 57 appointed special interest councillors, only 2 (Harare and Gweru)  have been 
appointed to represent the interests of this group. This represents 3.5% of the total number of 
special interest councillors in the selected local councils. The inadequate representation of the 
disabled as depicted on the composition of special interest councillors defeats the purpose of 
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 See Survey table of the composition of special interest councillors in 18 urban  local councils for different  urban 
councils. In two urban councils, namely Kwekwe and Chinhoyi the Minister did not make an appointment for 
special interest councillors. 
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inclusive representation, especially given the increasingly number of the disabled people in 
society. In the appointment of special interest councillors, the Minister claims that the interests of 
designated groups should be represented, but in the case of the disabled, the representation is not 
adequate and uniform for all urban councils. 
4.4.4 Appointment based on skill 
 
An analysis of the table shows that under skills there are those who have been involved in a 
specific working environment for a long time and have gained relevant experience, such as 
former mayors and councillors. These have been included based on the contribution that their 
skills would make to local government. Then there are those who have received training in a 
specific trade or vocation, such as medical or legal practitioners. These have been incorporated 
on the basis of their expertise. This is the basis on which „skills/expertise‟ and „interest‟ were 
distinguished in the table above. However for purposes of this discussion both columns of 
„skills/expertise‟ and „interest‟ will be regarded as representing skills. As a result, each of the 
appointed special interest councillors represents specific skills or interests. However there are 
cases where the skills of the appointees could not be confirmed, such as the case in Bulawayo 
and Chinhoyi.  
4.4.5 Frustrating residents for failing to vote for ZANU PF candidates  
 
From the way special interest councillors have been selected for appointment and the fact that 
most of them are former councillors, it is evident that the incumbents are losing candidates. The 
appointment of the incumbents is meant to frustrate the residents who refused to vote for the 
ZANU PF candidates.  It is also assumed that the MLGRUD seeks to sway the electorate in 
future elections by implanting voter apathy since resident will see no need to vote for an MDC 
candidate when at the end of the day both those that they voted for and those that they voted 
against will co-exist in council and enjoy the same benefits.  
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4.4.6 Exacerbating the scarcity of local council financial resources  
 
It is the researcher‟s interpretation that the appointment of special interest councillors whose 
salaries come from the coffers of local councils has been targeted as depleting financial resources 
in local councils and cripples them into failing to provide services to residents. The very essence 
of the appointment of special interest in addition to elected councillors has put pressure on local 
councils‟ financial resources. While it is a well-known fact that most local councils do not have 
adequate financial resources. Adding more councillors whose welfare and benefits have not been 
budgeted for exacerbates the scarcity of financial resources of local councils and decreases their 
propensity to provide quality service delivery to residents.  
4.5 Gaps in implementation of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act 
 
Several gaps have been identified in the implementation of section4 A of the Urban Councils 
Act. The researcher has observed that there is a lack of consistency and clarity on the number of 
special interest councillors that all appointed for each urban council. While the legislation
194
 
stipulates the maximum number of special interest councillors to be appointed to each local 
council, there is no mention of how many these should be. The lack of consistency is a result of 
the ambiguous nature of the provision.  This vague nature of the legislation has led to 
inconsistencies in the numbers of special interest councillors that are appointed for each council. 
Such inconsistencies in the allocation of special interest councillors have shown the extent to 
which legislation can be abused for political gain. The appointments have also shown that the 
term „special interest‟ has been interpreted straddle between skills/expertise and experience. This 
explains why there are more appointees with professional backgrounds which depict expertise 
than skill.  
The vague nature of the legislation has also led to the appointment of special interest councillors 
to those local councils which pose a political challenge and no appointments to those councils 
which do not. The fact that four years after the enactment of the legislation, some cities like 
Kwekwe and Shurugwi have no special interest councillors shows that these local councils do 
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 S4 A (1) (b), Urban Councils Act. 
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not pose much challenge to the Minister. It is common knowledge that the work of a Cabinet 
Minister is to implement policy and legislation, but taking such a long time to implement section 
4 A in some parts of the country is shows the extent to which the Minister can act arbitrarily. The 
most likely reason for this lack of urgency on the part of the Minister to appoint special interest 
councillors for some cities could be that such local councils do not present a major political 
challenge. 
4.6 Comparing section 4A to critical features of representative democratic governance 
 
Chapter 2 explored different international instruments and the COPAC draft to extrapolate 
critical features of representative governance. This part of the thesis compares section 4A of the 
Zimbabwe Urban Councils Act and elements of democratic governance as well as COPAC 
provisions on local governance. The exploration of different international instruments and the 
COPAC draft have led to the extrapolation of critical values which will be used in this section to 
establish the extent to which section 4 A complies with the requirements of representative 
democratic governance. The analysis and comparison of section 4 A to critical elements of 
representative governance will be guided by values extrapolated from international instruments 
and the COPAC draft. The values are devolution and Limits to central interference in which the 
discussion will be centred on the extent to which in the practice and implementation of section 4 
A, there has been devolution. In addition the analysis will seek to establish whether there has 
been a restraint on limiting central interference. The study will also seek to establish the extent to 
which local democracy has been provides in law and practice of section 4 A. Other elements that 
will be used to compare section 4 A to international instruments and COPAC draft are the level 
of representative democracy, transparency, participation and accountability in the practice that 
have been achieved in the practice and implementation of section 4 A. In addition the study will 
seek to establish whether the appointment of special interest councillors contributes to efficiency 
and effectiveness in local council operations and whether the practice is able to accommodate 
special interest and equity. In addition, the analysis will also seek to establish whether there is 
cooperation between levels of government. 
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4.6.1 Devolution and limited central government interference 
 
This section seeks to establish the extent to which the practice and implementation of section 4 A 
exhibits devolution of functions to local authorities. Devolution and decentralisation featured 
because both concepts call for the transfer of powers to sub-national levels for communities to 
make autonomous decision in line with the needs of localities.
195
 It has been argued that the 
major reason for devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities to lower levels of 
government is to empower them to make decisions that affect that their communities and to 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness.
196
 Devolution helps in limiting central government 
interference and at the same time transferring functions to local communities.  
In terms of section of 4A of the Urban Councils Act central government does not transfer power 
to communities to make appointments. While it can be acknowledged that central government 
has decentralised government functions to sub-national levels the Minister continues to appoint 
special interest councillors. Through legislative powers, the Minister can make additional 
appointments to all urban councils. The COPAC draft, assumes that devolution and 
decentralisation form the basis for local government and are the central themes that inform 
provincial and local council governance.
197
 While it can be acknowledged that section 4 A of the 
Urban Councils Act seeks to enhance capacity within local councils by incorporating expertise, it 
compromises devolution of power to sub-national level.  
The reason why the Minister does not consult local councils or communities is that from the way 
section 4A was enacted and how it has been implemented, it is evident that it was never intended 
to devolve power to lower levels of government. The legislation focuses on the Ministerial 
powers to intervene in local council affairs. The legislation therefore compromises devolution as 
it does not seek to consider input from local councils or communities. This failure to devolve 
power within section 4A enhances central government role in local council affairs. As a result, 
central government exercises unlimited interference in local council affairs. The legal framework 
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 S 14 (1), COPACdraft 
196
 S 14, (1) (1). 
197
 S14.1, COPAC draft.  
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and practice do not provide a restraint on central government interference in line with the 
principle of devolution. From the manner in which section 4 A is being implemented, it does not 
suggest that this principle of devolution is being respected. 
 It has also been noted in the table of special interest councillors above that the Minister may 
even decide not to make any appointments as is the case with the Kwekwe City Council and 
Shurugwi Town Council. In the case of determining how many individuals should be appointed 
as special interest councillors, the Minister makes the final decision. In addition it has also been 
observed that there is inconsistencies the appointments because in some cities the appointments 
are more than the 25% threshold, (Karoi 30%), while in other areas the appointments are less 
than the thresh hold (Chinhoyi, Chitungwiza, Kariba and Victoria Falls). In other towns the 
appointments comply with the 25% thresh hold (Bindura, Harare and Marondera). It is evident 
that the Minister acts subjectively in the implementing section 4A appointments and thus as an 
instrument of control which translates to lack of devolution. 
4.6.2 Local democracy 
 
The elements drawn from the international instruments and the COPAC draft in chapter 2 are 
representative, participation, transparency and accountability. In line with the requirements of 
different instruments and from practice, local democracy requires that communities elect or 
appoint leaders to represent their interests in government. At local government level, local 
communities should be involved in electing local leadership. The process of electing leadership 
should ensure that there is representivity, that the process enables participation of different 
people in the community, that there is transparency in the electoral process or the way the leaders 
are chosen or appointed and that the elected or appointed leaders are accountable to the 
community.  
4.6.2.1 Representative democracy 
 
In the case of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act the appointed special interest councillors are 
accountable to the MLGRUD and do not represent the interests of local communities. As such 
the practice of appointing special interest councillors falls short of representative democratic 
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governance requirements which require public officials to be elected by their communities to 
represent the affairs of the communities. It can be argued that the fact that only 2 special interest 
councillors belong to the MDC, representing about 4% of appointed councillors indicates that the 
practice of appointing special interest councillors does not appear to promote political pluralism. 
In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that appointed councillors are democratically elected 
or that they represent different political parties or different constituencies. In addition out of the 
57 special interest councillors appointed by the Minister, only 2 special interest councillors are 
from the MDC while the other 56 belong to ZANU PF as shown on the table above. Therefore 
the appointed councillors cannot be regarded as somehow representing democratic leadership. 
While it is acknowledged that special interest councillors are proportionally elected 
representatives, the fact that some of them have been rejected by residents (as shown by the case 
of Bulawayo), implies that the practice is unpopular with residents. This is further confirmed by 
negative media report which castigates the practice and implementation of section 4 by the 
Minister. In the case of section 4A the special interest councillors do not originate from people‟s 
choices and do not represent a confirmed constituency. In the appointment of special interest 
councillors in terms of section 4A residents are not consulted and the exclusion of residents in 
determining who should be appointed to administer their affairs does not comply with the 
requirements of representative democracy.  The councillors are therefore not a representation of 
local interests but represent the interests of the Minister who appointed them.  
4.6.2.2 Participation 
 
The principle of participation emerged as a critical feature of democratic governance. Effective 
participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance in public 
affairs helps to strengthen democratic institutions.
198
 In representative democratic governance, 
citizens should be involved in all decision-making processes that affect citizens‟ lives.  Evidence 
has shown that, the appointment of special interest councillors has been done by the Minister 
without and public consultation since the legislation instructing the appointment of special 
interest councillors does not provide for the transfer of powers to communities to participate in 
the appointment of such councillors.   
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 Article 3 (7), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2012). 
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However, in the practice and implementation of section 4 A, the MLGRUD is not required to 
seek their opinion in this regard. There is no provision calling on the MLGRUD to interact with 
residents. It would be argued that this piece of legislation does not conform to the requirements 
of participatory or representative democracy as it adopts a non-participatory approach to the 
appointment of special interest councillors in urban areas. It can be noted that this piece of 
legislation falls short of the principle of representative and participatory. The picture created by 
the table above suggests that the implementation of section 4 A does not suggest that residents 
should be part of the appointment process, especially given that residents rejected the very 
candidates who were eventually appointed by the Minister.  
4.6.2.3 Transparency 
 
Transparency has been identified in Chapter 2 as an important aspect of democratic decision 
making. Transparency refers to clarity and fairness in the management of public affairs.
199
 
Transparency in the election of political leadership forms the basis for a representative 
democracy 
200
 as it enhances legitimacy of elected leadership. Without transparency, decisions 
risk being rejected by the citizens as is the case of the seven special interest councillors 
appointed in Bulawayo (see table above). In the case of appointing special interest councillors in 
terms of section 4A there is no transparency about how special interest councillors are appointed 
by the MLGRUD. The fact that there are no criteria to guide the Minister in making the 
appointments has led to lack of transparency. In stipulating the appointment of special interest 
councillors, the law assumes that the Minister will appoint people with the required skills, 
experience and/or expertise. The lack of guidance may result in anybody being appointed as 
special interest councillor. As a result, the practice has become shrouded in mystery. These 
shortfalls make the procedure of appointing special interest councillors in terms of section 4A 
flawed since the practice lacks transparency. In addition the constituencies of the special interest 
councillors are subjective in the opinion of the Minister; hence some are not adequately 
represented while others like the business sectors are adequately represented. In addition, some 
special interest areas are not clearly defined such the education sector. Going by how section 4 A 
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 Article 3 (8), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). 
200
 Article (1) (vi), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). 
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is currently being implemented, as well as by the results of the survey; it can be argued that the 
value of transparency is not being observed. 
4.6.2.4 Accountability  
 
Accountable governance demands that public officials should be answerable to the public in the 
management of public affairs. Accountability of public officials should be directed at those who 
elected them into public office. Accountability to local communities provides checks and 
balances on public officials. Local councillors are elected into office through the electoral 
process and in accordance with existing electoral laws.
201
 As such the elected councillors strive 
to serve their local councils. Through the appointments of special interest councilors, the 
MLGRUD is able to monitor performance of public officials. As a result local leadership should 
be accountable to local communities. 
Section 4A is precise as to whom the appointed special interest councillors are accountable to. 
The fact that the special interest councillors “hold office at the pleasure of the Minister”202 
implies that they operate at the behest of the Minister who may dismiss them at any time. Given 
that the appointed special interest councillors are accountable to the Minister, it suggests that 
they serve the interests of the Minister. The appointment of special interest councillors in terms 
of section 4A put the elected councillors in a position where they are accountable to the Minister 
despite holding public office. Given that special interest councillors are public officials, it is 
reasonable to assume that they should be accountable to the public. However this is not the case 
as they are accountable to the MLGRUD. 
Following from the language of section 4 A, whoever is appointed is the Minister‟s personal 
preference and as such should be accountable to the Minister. It is also worth noting that the 
tenure of those appointed as special interest councillors is decided by the Minister who may 
decide to renew their appointment, dismiss or suspend the incumbents. The Minister thus 
determines their working conditions. The legislation and practice of appointing special interest 
councillors compromises the accountability of special interest councillors to the public or their 
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 14 (2) (ii), COPAC draft (July 2012). 
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 S 4 A (2), Urban Councils Act (2008). 
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respective local councils. Therefore the law and practice of section 4 A does not suggest that the 
value of accountability is being respected.  
4.6.3 Accommodating special interests/equity 
 
Inclusiveness ensures the representation of all social groups in the community and contributes to 
local democracy. Inclusiveness also helps in mobilising different groups in the community. 
Equity has been used interchangeably with inclusiveness in most instruments. Equity enables the 
representation of different social groups on an equal basis irrespective of their social status and 
gender.
203
 Out of a cumulative total of 57 special interest councillors for 18 urban local councils, 
only 8 are women. This is a far cry from the provisions of major instruments which call for 
gender balance and equality in governance and development processes.
204
   
The appointment of special interest councilors is one way of achieving equity. In appointing 
special interest councillors in terms of section 4A there is no evidence that the Minister considers 
appointing individuals representing different political, economic and social sectors. The 
incorporation of appointed special interest councillors, mostly from ZANU PF, does not really 
add to pluralism and renders the composition of local councils inadequate in terms of 
incorporation of other political parties or interests other than those presented on the table above. 
In principle the inclusion of special interest councillors could facilitate the accommodation of a 
variety of interests, particularly those of vulnerable groups such as the disabled, women, 
minority groups and political parties. However the fact that the Minister is not required to 
ascertain prospective appointees‟ expertise leads to arbitrary appointments, which might not 
include those able to represent the interest of vulnerable groups. It can therefore be challenged 
that their presence in local councils as appointed councillors does not contribute to political 
pluralism. Political pluralism would entail the existence of individuals from different political 
backgrounds and elected into council to represent their constituencies. In the case of special 
interest councillors, they do not have the mandate of the people and as such cannot be recognised 
as contributing to political pluralism. From the table of special interest councillors drawn from 
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eighteen (18) urban councils (in two councils no appointments were made),
205
 there is no or very 
little evidence to show representation of vulnerable groups. Of the 57 special interest councillors 
in different towns, only three represent the interest of the disabled (Harare, Gweru and 
Masvingo). The rest of the special interests councillors have been appointed on the basis of skills 
such as business, legal, medical and educational skills. All these are considered as exclusive 
interest of those pursuing affluent lifestyles. It can therefore be argued that while the notion of 
appointing special interest councillors is noble, the practice is fraught with inconsistencies which 
results in the representation of the well-to-do and not the vulnerable groups. It can therefore be 
acknowledged that while there is pluralism in the composition of local councils as a result of the 
incorporation of special interest councillors that does not benefit the target groups. The interests 
of marginalised groups such as the disabled, the homeless and orphans as well as organised 
groups such as residents have either been inadequately represented or have not been represented 
at all.  
In terms of section 4A the appointment of special interest councillors is not based on any criteria, 
hence there is no provision for affirmative action. Although it is argued that special interest 
councillors could represent specific expertise, often marginalised groups such as women, the 
disabled and people living with HIV/AIDS, are not considered as a priority for representation. 
There is no evidence to suggest that these are equitably and sufficiently represented. As a result, 
section 4A falls short of the requirements of democratic and representative governance which 
prescribes equity as a vital condition and requirement.  
Despite the existence of an opportunity presented by section 4 A to represent the interests of 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups such as orphans, the homeless and the disabled, the 
MLGRUD has not taken advantage of it. Instead it would seem the Minister has concentrated on 
political survival at the expense of the general populations‟ interests. It could therefore be argued 
that section 4 A has a noble intention of representing the interests of different sectors of society 
but the Minister has confined the terms of the legislation to those that he regards as vital for him. 
The practice of having more special interest councillors from one political party and less from 
another party does not meet the requirement of political pluralism that helps to strengthen 
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democracy. The fact that the Minister appoints individuals whose skills or expertise are known 
confirms the likelihood that appointed special councillors have a contribution to make towards 
enhancing effectiveness of local councils.  In addition to the failure of the system to promote 
political pluralism as discussed above, it shows that the implementation of this legislation does 
not recognise other minority political parties or other people from marginalised groups in the 
community whose interest are not being represented or where there is no such evidence. As a 
result it can be noted that by appointing more special interest councillors from one political party 
and without being gender sensitive, the Minister has failed to achieve inclusiveness. It can 
therefore be noted that section 4A fails to meet the requirements of inclusiveness in 
representative democratic governance.  
4.6.4 Effective and efficient decision making 
 
Efficiency implies using minimum resources to get maximum output and making sound 
decisions. In the case of local government efficiency would mean using available resources 
economically. Although special interest councillors have no vote, their existence as advisors to 
the councils enables councils to make informed decisions on policy formulation and 
implementation. Taking cognisance of their experience in local government, it is assumed that 
they have some contribution that they can make to enhance the performance of local 
councillors.
206
 In terms of section 4A there is no evidence that the inclusion of special interest 
councillors has enhanced the quality of decision making. However what is evident is that the 
additional special interest councillors are an additional financial burden on local councils which 
contribute to the depletion of council financial resources.  
On the other hand the disagreements that are likely to erupt in local councils as a result of 
different political backgrounds between the elected and appointed councillors are likely to 
compromise of effectiveness. It can therefore be argued that the legislation and practice of 
appointing special interest councillors have not improved the efficiency and effectiveness of 
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local councils. What is evident is that there has been increased inefficiency as local councils 
become increasingly bankrupt while effectiveness has decreased as evidenced by dilapidated 
infrastructure in most towns.
207
  
The practice and implementation of section 4 A could most likely have had an impact on sound 
decision making processes. Sound decision making involves incorporating the community in 
making decisions that affect the lives of the people in that community. Although from a policy 
point of view, the infusion of special interest councillors would facilitate sound decision making, 
the practice of appointing the councillors is fraught with inconsistencies. This eventually defeats 
the purpose of inserting skills in local councils.  
Despite the assumption that the presence of special interest councillors enhances the efficiency 
and effectiveness of local councils, but the differences in political ideologies of elected and 
appointed should not be taken lightly. There is evidence from media reports that the political 
rivalry between the elected MDC councillors and the appointed special interest councillors, have 
led to fraught relationships that would negatively impact on sound decision making. As a result it 
can be pointed out that the presence of experienced former ZANU PF councillors would likely 
not contribute to sound decision making or strengthen council debates. 
4.6.5 Cooperation between levels of government 
 
Cooperation between levels of government entails the cooperation, co-existence and interaction 
between different levels of government to implement policies. Cooperative governance enhances 
the efficient implementation of public policies as different levels of government complement 
each other in this regard. From the composition of special interest councillors provided above, 
there is no evidence of cooperation between the Minister who represents central government, and 
local authorities, in the appointment of special interest councillors. Section 4A does not 
recognise or facilitate for cooperation between different levels of government. Also, in 
implementing section 4A the Minister does not act in the spirit of cooperation. In making the 
appointments, the Minister does not consult local councils. The way section 4A has been 
implemented leaves local councils with no role to play in the appointment of these councillors 
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despite the fact that the councillors will serve together in local councils. This is a recipe for 
failure as it creates a rift between central and local governments. It also shows that the 
interaction between central and local government is not in the spirit of cooperation but one in 
which local councils receive and implement policies handed down from central government. It 
can therefore be argued that section 4 A does not comply with the requirements of cooperative 
governance because there is no evidence of consultation between central government 
(represented by the Minister) and local government (represented by local councils).  
4.7 Observations 
 
The discussions about the practice and implementation of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act 
concluded that in appointing special interest councillors in urban local councils, the Minister is 
not required to consult residents or local councils. The Minister eventually makes the 
appointments of special interest councillors at his discretion. This was further shown by the 
composition of special interest councillors appointed in different urban councils in which the 
Minister did not comply with legislation. While in some cases the Minister appointed less than 
the required quota, in other cases the Minister did not appoint any special councillors at all. 
There is evidence to show that the practice and law of section 4 A compromises the 
accountability of the appointed special interest councillors who should be answerable to the 
Minister. Therefore the researcher makes recommendations that would strengthen the practice 
and implementation of appointing councillors in urban local councils. In addition the researcher 
may also seek to provide ways in which local the operation of councils can be strengthened. 
 The researcher has also observed that the tenure of the appointees rests with the Minister who 
can either renew or terminate it. It has also been shown that most appointed councillors belong to 
ZANU PF which practice does not translate to political pluralism because there should be other 
factors that may be considered in appointing special interest councillors other than putting 
emphasis on political affiliation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
The previous chapter presented a survey of twenty urban councils and the composition of the 
councils in terms of both elected and appointed councillors. It emerged that there is no regulated 
appointment of councillors to represent special interests. The practice and law of section 4 A was 
also found to be implemented inconsistently. In some cases many individuals are appointed to 
represent one special interest, while in other areas like the disabled there are very few individuals 
appointed to represent their interests of the disabled.  The study also presented critical features of 
democratic governance whose values were used to test section 4 A and the extent to which it 
complies with the requirements of democratic representative governance. From the analysis of 
section 4 A against the values of representative democratic governance extrapolated from 
international instruments and the COPAC draft, it emerged that the legislation has failed to 
comply with the major requirements of representative democratic governance. From the 
discussions above, it can be noted that the practice and implementation of section 4 A does not 
only negate international benchmarks on representative democratic governance, but falls short of 
the basic democratic requirements of participation and transparency. Instead of curbing corrupt 
practices in local councils, there is evidence to show that the subjective appointments by the 
Minister could promote corrupt practices.  
Taking note of the way the practice and law of section 4 A, the researcher makes 
recommendations based on the values that were extrapolated from Chapter 2. The researcher will 
seek to identify how devolution and limits to central interference can be achieved; how local 
democracy could be enhanced; ways in which community participation and transparency in the 
implementation of local government legislation can be incorporated in legislation. In addition, 
recommendations will also include ways in which special interests of different groups and equity 
can be represented in local councils. Lastly the study would also seek to suggest ways of 
enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of local councils. 
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5.2 Recommendations  
 
5.2.1 Devolution and limits to central interference 
 
Devolution ensures that lower levels of government are empowered to make their own decisions 
in line with national legislation. The researcher recommends that having noted that the practice 
and implementation of section 4 A violates democratic practices; it would be in the best interest 
of residents and democracy to either repeal or amend the legislation. If the legislation is to be 
amended, it should aim to ensure that local councils have a say in the appointment of special 
interest councillors. In the event that the legislation is repealed, I should ensure that all 
councillors are democratically elected. 
If the notion of appointed councillors is to be retained, local councils should be given the 
opportunity to present their own candidates for appointment by the Minister. In this way the 
interference of the Minister would be limited since individuals would be presented to him to 
choose from, contrary to the current position where the Minister identifies and points individuals 
without consultation.  
5.2.2 Local Democracy  
 
In order to enhance local democracy the researcher provides two recommendations. The first 
option would be for the Minister to make the appointments, subject to consultation with 
residents. Alternatively, as has been alluded to above, residents may come up with lists of 
preferred candidates. Under this option, residents comply lists of candidates that they know have 
the required expertise and skills to represent different interests. Once such lists have been 
complied, they are presented to the Minister who should, on the recommendation of local boards 
made up of residents makes the final appointment.  
The second option entails residents making the appointments from among local people who have 
the required skills and expertise to represent different groups in their localities. In this option, 
residents use their knowledge of their community to identify local residents who have specific 
skills and expertise that can represent designated interests in local councils. It is common 
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knowledge that residents know each other better than a Cabinet Minister; they are likely to 
appoint qualified individuals in terms of experience, skill, expertise and those from marginalised 
groups whose interests should be prioritised.  
Both options require the amendment or repulsion of the current legislation on the appointment of 
special interest councillors in urban councils to be able to provide criteria to be used in 
identifying and eventually appointing the right individuals.  As such the local communities and 
local councils should be instrumental in appointing special interest councillors to take charge of 
specific areas. As such the incumbents should individuals who are elected or appointed to 
promote local democracy, and in which the respective communities take part in the identification 
and appointment of special interest councillors.  
As with the above critical feature of devolution, existing legislation should be amended to 
incorporate community participation in the identification of local individuals with the 
prerequisite skills and expertise that would help to strengthen democratic governance in local 
councils. A broader interpretation of special interest areas should therefore be considered.  
Involving communities in the appointment of special interest councillors would improve 
transparency and accountability because the individuals so appointed would be aware of the role 
of the community in the appointment and is more inclined to be accountable to the local 
community. Such a way of appointing special interest councillors would also minimise nepotism 
and help reduce the powers of the Minister in decision making processes. Equity is also likely to 
be improved since communities are in a position to know those social groups which are under-
represented in public office.  
In addition, the process of appointing the councillors should be transparent and should recognise 
the right of communities to choose local leaders. It is common knowledge that individuals feel 
grateful to those who appoint them to a position. In the same way the current situation is that 
special interest councillors feel obliged to be accountable to the Minister who appoints them to 
local councils. Amending the legislation to enable communities to make the appointments would 
entitle the appointees to be accountable to local communities.  
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
5.2.3 Accommodating special interests/equity 
 
Casting the net wider by calling upon communities to provide lists of individuals with expertise 
and skills in designated areas of local governance would help in coming up with candidates 
possessing the best skills and expertise. Such a process of identifying people with skills and 
expertise would legitimise the practice and implementation of appointing special interest 
councillors. The legislation should either be enacted or the existing legislation be amended to 
contain the provision of having special interest councilors in urban local councils to represent 
designated interests. Such legislation would also need to contain a clause providing criteria of the 
qualities that are required in candidates vying for appointment as special interest councillors. The 
problem that has been identified with the practice and implementation of section 4 A has been 
that it lacks criteria to guide the Minister in appointing individuals for such appointments.  
In the practice and law of section 4 A the definition of special interest area has been limited to 
the disabled and women and the vulnerable groups, whose interests are not adequately 
represented as shown in the survey of twenty urban councils. However in the end the 
appointments include professionals and individuals with experience in local government affairs.  
It could also be as a result of the Minister‟s limited interpretation of the definition of „special 
interest‟ areas. Providing guidelines that define which areas should be considered as „special 
interest‟ areas would help avoid such a trend. Providing guidelines would also help in providing 
for equity and inclusiveness of minority groups and other marginalised groups such as the 
homeless, widows, and the youth. 
As a result, it is recommended that if the practice of appointing special interest councilors is to 
be retained, existing legislation should be amended to contain a clause that stipulates clear 
criteria on how and for how long the special interest councillors should be appointed. The criteria 
should be clear on to whom the appointees should be accountable, who should pay the 
appointees, and for how long should they incumbents be in council as well as the specific 
interests that the incumbents would represent in local councils. The issue of appointing losing 
candidates would most likely be avoided since the criteria in place would also seek to address the 
identification of suitable candidates whom who may not be strongly inclined to specific political 
parties, save for the elected councillors who are elected to represent their respective political 
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parties. With such criteria contained in the legislation, the current challenges pertaining to 
accountability, transparency and inclusiveness would be curtailed. 
The researcher also recommends that distinction between skills and expertise should be made so 
as to avoid mistaking one for the other in the appointment of special interest councillors.  
In addition the researcher recommends that there should be clarity on what skills and expertise 
local councils require, before making the appointments. It should only be after local councils 
have identified what skills and expertise they require that suitable appointments would be made. 
5.2.4 Cooperation between levels of government 
 
The current practice and implementation of appointing special interest councillors compromises 
cooperative governance. To improve the relationship between central and local government, the 
introduction of advisory boards comprising members from central government and local councils 
would help to promote cooperation between central and local government. Such advisory boards 
would help in the interpretation of local governance statutes and provide a roadmap of 
implementing such legislation. In addition, the advisory boards would take part in a number of 
functions such as  
 advising the Minister on special skills and the criteria to be used in appointment of 
special interests councillors;  
 advising the Minister on special interest areas and the criteria to use to determine whether 
an area is a special interest or not; 
 nominating candidates for consideration by the Minister; 
 vetting candidates that will have been nominated by residents 
With such advisory boards in place, there is likely to be consensus between the two levels of 
government in the implementation of section 4 A. 
Given that Ministers are politicians, in some cases they do not have the knowledge of the 
portfolios that they handle, it would not be appropriate to leave the practice and implementation 
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of legislation to them. The current system of appointing special interest councillors to local 
councils did not take into consideration the availability of resources. It would be appropriate to 
consult with the concerned local councils to establish the status in terms of resources and 
whether the available resources can accommodate new appointed councillors. If such local 
councils do not have adequate resources, the appointment of councillors would be set aside until 
such a time when resources are available 
5.2.5 Effective and efficient decision making 
 
As has been discussed above, the lack of criteria to guide the Minister in making the 
appointments has also led to flawed decisions in terms of the calibre of candidates that are 
eventually appointed. It is recommended that special interest councillors be appointed based on 
criteria set by local councils since the councils know the special interests that they want to be 
represented in their councils. However, the local councils should be guided by legislation to 
define what constitute a special interest area. This would help local councils to identify 
candidates with the skills and expertise that they require in their local councils as well as 
interests of those people in their communities that they think should be represented.  
With regards to the working conditions of the appointed special interest councillors it is 
recommended that this be borne by central government since the individuals are not elected by 
local residents. Such councillors should not be allowed to strain the financial resources of local 
councils compromise their ability to provide efficient and effective services to residents.  
5.3 General remarks 
 
It has been noted that the practice and implementation of section 4 A of the Urban Councils Act 
has not complied with the critical features of representative governance extrapolated from 
international instruments and the COPAC draft. It was noted that the COPAC draft contains 
crucial elements that would provide democratic local governance. If political developments in 
Zimbabwe are anything to go by, there are chances that the COPAC draft will pass through the 
referendum stage and become the new Constitution of Zimbabwe. In the event that the COPAC 
draft sails through the referendum and eventually become law, local government will be 
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transformed. It also remains to be seen whether the practice of appointing special interest 
councillors as provided by section 4 A will survive under the new Constitution.  
However, given the acrimony between the two major political parties in the country, namely 
ZANU PF and the MDC-T, it remains to be seen whether the two political rivals would 
collaborate or stick to democratic principles of governance.  
From the way section 4 has been implemented, there it is evident that the current system of local 
government is untenable and need to be transformed or overhauled. This means that either 
section 4 A be repealed or amended to modify or leave out section 4 A and replace it with 
legislation that promotes democratic governance. These remarks, if considered, would go a long 
way in transforming local governance in general and the operations of local councils in achieving 
their objectives. 
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